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ABSTRACT
What's the difference between litigation and alternative dispute resolution
(ADR)? Litigation is war. ADR is kumbaya by the campfire. Litigation favors
the strong over the weak. ADR gives everyone a voice. Litigation is about
competition and gameplay. ADR is about cooperation and problem-solving.
Litigation is coercive. ADR is consensual. Litigation brings out the worst in
people. ADR brings out the best. In short, litigation is dystopian, and ADR is
utopian. This sanguine conception ofADR has been popular for decades but
is hopelessly inadequate. Although a utopian-dystopian dynamic does indeed
fuel much ADR scholarship, this dichotomy is not as simple as ADR-good
law-bad. Not only are there multiple utopian visions in ADR that are
sometimes contradictory, the utopianism of ADR may actually make
alternative processes more vulnerable to dystopian propensities than
traditional legal processes. This article explores these paradoxes by
examining the ways in which alternative processes respond to legal
deficiencies, imagine different approaches to dispute resolution, and manage
the ideological and practical challenges of effectuating positive social
change. Understanding more about how ADR navigates between utopian and
dystopian visions of sociopolitical life illuminates certain cultural
assumptions around the possibilities and limits of dispute resolution while
suggesting new directions for ADR theory.
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GAMES, DYSTOPIA, AND ADR
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following: North America has been ravaged by wars and
natural disasters, and the emergent social order consists of a Capitol (located
on or around present-day Denver) and twelve Districts. The Capitol wrings
every last resource out of the impoverished Districts, so much so that the
Districts have unsuccessfully tried to revolt in the past. After crushing this
rebellion and imposing martial law, the Capitol institutes the Hunger Games,
a televised fight to the death between District children. Each year, the Capitol
requires each District to send two children to participate in the Games; each
year, only one child of the original twenty-four returns to the District. This
gruesome exercise of state power demoralizes the Districts and provides an
annual reminder of the Capitol's dominance.
This bleak scenario is the premise of The Hunger Games novels, a
popular recent example of modem dystopian fiction.' Broadly put, dystopian
works play out the terrible possible future consequences of present-day
realities and provide an imaginative, if somewhat urgent and distorted,
normative space for reexamining current assumptions and priorities. 2
Lawyers reading The Hunger Games might see a dystopian vision of modern
litigation taken to its nightmarish extreme: a state-sponsored adversarial
contest that prevents parties from taking matters into their own hands,
protects existing power structures, and devastates participants, financially
and personally, even if they prevail. Robert Cover's famous pronouncement
that "[1]egal interpretation takes place on a field of pain and death" likewise
connects law and violence, pointing out that the judicial opinion is more than
just a textual construct because it has unavoidably real-life consequences for
defendants, sometimes brutally depriving them of liberty, property, children,
or even life itself.3
1 Suzanne Collins, a writer of television programs and novels directed at children
and young adults, originally published The Hunger Games in 2008, followed by Catching
Fire in 2009 and Mockinglay in 2010. The trilogy has been enormously popular with
young adult (YA) and adult audiences alike. See Susan Dominus, The Strange Fictions of
Suzanne Collins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011, at MM30; Laura Miller, Fresh Hell: What's
Behind the Boom in Dystopian Fiction for Young Readers?, NEW YORKER, June 14,
2010, at 132.
2 In 1946, Huxley used the word "utopia" to describe the "bad place" in Brave New
World; in 1952, J. Max Patrick coined the term "dystopia" to clarify "the distinction
between the good place ... and its opposite." ERIKA GOTTLIEB, DYSTOPIAN FICTION EAST
AND WEST: UNIVERSE OF TERROR AND TRIAL 4 (2001).
3 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
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That the law might be just a game-if, at times, a deadly one-is a
common articulation of the tension between legal institutions and social
values. The same rules that protect us from arbitrary treatment in law courts,
for example, can be "gamed" by practitioners and officials, subverting the
idea that legal process delivers truth and justice.4 On this view, the current
popularity of dystopian works like the Hunger Games actually may reflect
pervasive anxieties about modem legal and political institutions: the
inhumanity of judicial-coercive machinery, the apparent unaccountability of
state and corporate actors, the failure of political imagination despite the
desperate need for political reform, and the threat (or promise) of social order
imposed through state-sponsored, legally sanctioned violence.
How does alternative dispute resolution (ADR) fit into this picture? One
might argue that ADR counteracts the dystopian tendencies of the law by
providing malleable, party-driven approaches that transcend law-as-game
dynamics. 5 Part of our fascination with ADR, after all, comes from what
might be thought of as a dystopian critique of the law, a critique that
imagines law's future as bad deals and unsatisfactory resolutions between
parties who have little or no agency in the process and who are, in the final
4 Although Cover did not compare the law to a game, such a comparison may
resonate with his recognition of the fundamental disconnect between legal institutions
and social values. "The gulf between thought and action widens wherever serious
violence is at issue, because for most of us, evolutionary, psychological, cultural and
moral considerations inhibit the infliction of pain on other people." Id. at 1613.
Complaints that lawyers treat the legal system like a game without regard for the values
underpinning the system are commonplace. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Originalism,
Precedent, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 135 (2011) ("[T]he
public still needs to believe that judges are not on an ideological crusade, using clever
chess moves to get their preferred results by any means necessary"); Susan Hayes
Stephan, Blowing the Whistle on Justice as Sport: 100 Years of Playing a Non-Zero Sum
Game, 30 HAMLINE L. REv. 588 (2007) (asserting that despite the inefficiency of
"playing" litigation as a zero-sum game, the legal community continues to do so). Part of
the issue, of course, is that there will always be a gap between the goals and capabilities
of any complex system, legal or otherwise. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Deconstruction's
Legal Career, 27 CARDozo L. REv. 719, 739 (2005) ("A fundamental inadequacy always
exists between the demands of justice and the products of culture, but we can only
express this inadequacy through the cultural means at our disposal.").
5 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a
New Practice, 70 TEN. L. REv. 63 (2002) (asserting the importance of problem-solving
and related skills in ethical legal practice); Daniel J. Guttman, For Better or Worse, Till
ADR Do Us Part: Using Antenuptial Agreements to Compel Alternatives to Traditional
Adversarial Litigation, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 175 (1996) (promoting ADR as an
alternative to litigation gamesmanship).
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analysis, emotionally and financially bankrupted by lawyers and litigation. In
response to this legal dystopia, ADR offers "alternatives" or process
innovations that attempt to mitigate the dystopian effects of traditional law
while moving participants toward more utopian visions of dispute
resolution. 6
The utopian promise of ADR has captured the imagination of the public
and policymakers alike. Indeed, the past thirty years have seen tremendous
growth and proliferation of alternative processes, inside and outside legal
culture. Arbitration, court-annexed mediation, and early case management
programs are moving traditional legal disputes, particularly between
consumers and corporations, outside of the courthouse into more private,
"informal" spaces that promise greater efficiency and accuracy in dispute
resolution.7 Developments in mediation, such as narrative mediation and
transformative practice, have brought more focus to the subjectivity of the
participants -and the experiential value of the process itself. And the
emergence of innovative processes-med-arb, hybrid consensus building,
dispute systems design, ombuds offices, mass disaster mediation, class-wide
settlements-have differentiated and expanded the dispute resolution
landscape even further.8
6 There is, however, more than one ADR utopia. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
7 See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Penumbra: Arbitration Law and
the Rapidly Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 NEV. L.J. 427 (2007)
(discussing the evolving arbitration laws and how they apply to broader ADR processes);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is the Adversary System Really Dead? Dilemmas of Legal
Ethics as Legal Institutions and Roles Evolve, 57 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 85, 87 (2005)
("We are now in a time of transition away from trial by the 'ordeal' of court, though it
may not be quite clear that we are moving uniformly... toward 'private' trials or other
legal events for the resolution of our disputes with each other"); see also Eric D. Green,
Corporate Alternative Dispute Resolution, I OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 203 (1986)
(discussing and analyzing the various dispute prevention, management, and resolution
methods in use with corporations, including "private justice procedures.").
8 See, e.g., Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009) (listing various forms of
alternative dispute resolution); Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial:"
The Growth and Impact of "Alternative Dispute Resolution," 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STuD. 843, 845 (2004) ("The first obstacle to an understanding of the role of ADR is the
sheer breadth and diversity of activities to be taken into account, a breathtaking range of
approaches and strategies that we lump under the heading of 'ADR' (an outmoded
acronym that survives as a matter of convenience)"); Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K.
Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather than One Eclectic Process, 2000
J. Disp. RESOL. 295, 306 (2000) ("Let one hundred flowers bloom!"), cited in Shana H.
Khader, Mediating Mediations: Protecting the Homeowner's Right to Self-Determination
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At first blush, these developments in ADR may seem like progress: more
individualized processes, more party autonomy, quicker resolutions, more
harmonious outcomes. The dystopian theorist, however, might see things
differently. What tradeoffs take place when public adjudicatory functions go
private? What sacrifices does a truly efficient dispute resolution system
demand? "World peace" is the paradigmatic uncontroversial good, at least
until one begins to imagine the various kinds of political apparatus that might
bring about such peace. Ultimately, the utopianism of ADR--developed in
response to dystopian law-has its own unavoidably dystopian implications.
On this view, it is not at all clear whether alternative processes actually
ameliorate the tensions inherent in legal institutions or simply replicate them
in some other form. Could ADR be just another reflection of the Hunger
Games?
This article argues that modern alternative processes are just as
susceptible to the dystopian inclinations that afflict the legal system, if not
more so. The notion that mediation, arbitration, and other ADR processes
articulate (coherent, unitary) alternatives to (chaotic, conflicted) law may
perpetuate the fallacy that ADR transcends the dystopian tendencies of the
law, which may in turn make it difficult to see how alternative processes may
actually undermine their own utopian aspirations. For both law and ADR,
these dystopian tendencies often manifest as games-established procedures,
rules, and roles that impose structure, reduce complexity, privilege particular
norms and values, and provide for outcomes-that may be capable of
becoming hideous caricatures of themselves. 9
in Foreclosure Mediation Programs, 44 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 109 (2010) (looking
critically at new and hybrid developments in foreclosure mediation practice); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait
Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 297,
325-26 (1996) (examining the hybrid forms and new versions of dispute processing
developed since Frank Sander's initial list of appropriate dispute resolution methods).
9 There are limits to the "Hunger Games" metaphor. Collins's Hunger Games are not
well-intentioned institutions gone awry, like law or ADR arguably might be; they were
always intended as an oppressive tool. The reason why the Games work so well as
oppressive tools, however, is that they take the form of a regular game (rules,
competitors, arena, prizes, etc.) with the public in the passive role of spectator, relegated
to watching and maybe even rooting for favorites but unable to interfere with the
gameplay. Choosing a game format is key: the Capitol does not oppress the populace
through ritual sacrifice or random execution of children or some other grisly show of
force, but instead imposes a norm of passivity and helplessness onto the masses by
harnessing their collective, internalized understanding around games and fairness. In this
way, the Capitol warps and distorts a regular game into an oppressive/dystopian game-
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Unpacking the utopian mythology of ADR provides a useful critical lens
on alternative practices and their proliferation. As scholars have argued
forcefully for decades, ADR practices can work serious (even if unintended)
harm on participants and society. Informal or extralegal processes can divest
disputants of procedural safeguards, replicate power imbalances, retard legal
and social progress, and overextend state control.' 0 Reconceptualizing ADR
within a utopian/dystopian framework suggests that such harmful
developments may be the byproducts of two powerful impulses in ADR
scholarship and practice: one, a reaction against dystopian visions of
conventional law; and two, a sometimes dogmatic utopianism reflecting an
established set of ideological and process commitments. The combination of
these two impulses-what might be called the "utopian/dystopian dynamic"
of ADR-animates the creativity, the experimentalism, and the recklessness
that often characterize modem alternative practice.
The article consists of three intersecting parts: games, dystopia, and
ADR. Part One explores game metaphors in the law, with special emphasis
on the work of Arthur Allen Leff. Professor Leff, who is perhaps best known
for a series of articles about moral indeterminacy in legal thought, developed
the "ludic metaphor" to explain why people gravitate toward games in law
and legal scholarship. His work on game and game metaphors in law, within
the larger context of his scholarship, provides the first theoretical beam for an
inquiry into ADR processes and procedures.
Part Two introduces dystopian literature as a potentially useful
instrument for evaluating the ludic tendencies of both law and ADR.11
this distortion/warping is the sense in which I'm using the term "Hunger Game" in this
article.
10 See text accompanying notes infra at 150; see also, e.g., Stephan Landsman, ADR
and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593 (2005) (arguing that compulsory
ADR may further disenfranchise structurally weak parties); Richard Delgado et al.,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359 (1985) (setting out "the left critique of ADR.").
11 As many scholars have argued, reading fiction and legal texts together can open
an imaginative space for thinking through present political and legal choices. "'Law and
literature' is more a group of heterogeneous movements than one all-encompassing,
monolithic movement. People who do work in law and literature may focus on analyzing
law as literature, law in literature, legal storytelling, or a variety of other areas. Roughly
speaking, however, a common thread woven throughout law and literature studies is an
interest in the interpretation and/or creation of narrative, or, in other words, an interest in
story." Lenora Ledwon, The Poetics of Evidence: Some Applications from Law &
Literature, 21 QuINNIPIAc L. REV. 1145, 1146 n.3 (2003). Early pathbreaking scholarship
in the area includes RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW
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Connecting games and "hunger games" is not just wordplay, but instead
expresses the sociopolitical inversions at the center of so many dystopian
works: supposedly benevolent institutions yield to oppressive interests,
community norms are turned against individuals, and "doublethink" 12 -
Orwell's term for selective remembering and forgetting-replaces critical
thought. Dystopian literature often expresses these reversals (game to Hunger
Game) through, appropriately enough, games and game metaphors within the
narratives themselves. Studying these literary game structures has two
analytical benefits: one, illuminating our love/hate response to games in the
law; and two, providing additional interpretive tools for evaluating games in
legal and alternative contexts.
Part Three explores implications of the foregoing analysis for alternative
processes and appropriate dispute resolution. The -market economy of
alternative processes has produced a dizzying array of dispute resolution
offerings. Whether these offerings represent actual progress or just additional
"gaming of the system" is an important inquiry for ADR scholars to
undertake. 13 Moreover, situating ADR studies and practice with respect to
legal studies and practice requires deeper thinking about how utopian
impulses and dystopian responses shape the development of the field. Such
analysis provides more insight into some of the central puzzles of ADR and
suggests additional avenues for research.
AND LITERATURE (1992); Robin L. West, The Literary Lawyer, 27 PAC. L.J. 1187 (1996);
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 179 (1982); James Boyd
White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 415
(1982). Dystopian literature is a common subject for literary-minded legal analyses. See
infra note 74. Although the law and literature movement is expansive, and although ADR
scholarship and pedagogy often use popular culture references as illustrations, there is no
"ADR and Literature" movement, even as a submovement of Law and Literature. This
may be, in part, because there are not many overt references to ADR in popular media.
See James E. McGuire, Mediation in Fiction: A Grail Quest, DisP. RESOL. MAG. Summer
2007, at 24 (noting the difficulties in finding explicit references to mediation in literature
and film); Jennifer L. Schulz, The Mediator as Cook: Mediation Metaphors at the
Movies, 2007 J. DIsp. RESOL. 455 (2007) (same).
12 "Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind
simultaneously, and accepting both of them." GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR
223 (Peter Davison Alfred A. Knop ed., 1987) (1949).
13 For an outstanding example of scholarship that critically examines process
proliferation in ADR, see Amy Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the
Problem ofScale, 14 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 51 (2009) (suggesting that scaling individual
dispute resolution models to larger dispute and deal contexts may perpetuate existing
social inequalities).
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II. GAMES
Before considering the connection between ADR and The Hunger
Games, it may be helpful to think through whether ADR is like a game at all.
Johan Huizinga observed that "[t]he great archetypal activities of human
society are all permeated with play from the start;"' 4 indeed, the predilection
for playing games and recasting sociopolitical life into games and game
metaphors remains a striking feature of contemporary society. Games are
appealing analytical units because they are intellectually accessible and
compact, providing quick traction for examinations into the structure,
dynamics, and norms of interpersonal and organizational behaviors. This part
first briefly considers the prevalence of game metaphors in modem legal
culture, providing examples of how "ludism" (defined here as "incorporating
games and gameplay") generally informs how we speak and think about the
law. The part then turns to Arthur Allen Leff, a Yale law professor who set
forth the "ludic metaphor" and suggested that an irresistible desire for
determinacy may be what informs our predilection for games, recreational
and otherwise. Finally, the part examines how ADR processes may be
amenable to game metaphors and ludic thinking.
A. Game Thinking and Legal Culture
It's nothing new to say that Americans are obsessed with games, both as
players and spectators,15 and the law has followed suit. For lawyers, games
14 JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LuDENs: A STUDY OF THE PLAY-ELEMENT IN CULTURE
(Roy Publishers. 1950) (1938). Huizinga, a Dutch sociologist, referred to the "homo
ludens" ("Man the Player") as a species whose society is characterized by games and
play. Huizinga used the term "ludic factor" to describe the "non-seriousness" inherent in
competition. Id. at 30-31. Huizinga and Roger Caillois are two of the most well-known
foundational figures in sociological game studies. ROGER CAILLOIS, MAN, PLAY, AND
GAMES (Meyer Barash trans., The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc.) (1961). One outgrowth of
their scholarship can be seen in Nassim Taleb's work, which interrogates the human
predilection to make meaning out of randomness. Taleb uses the term "ludic fallacy" to
refer to the human tendency to mistakenly use games to understand and justify real-world
conclusions. NASsIM N. TALEB, THE BLACK SwAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE 309 (2007).
15 Abundant evidence exists that Americans love playing and watching games. See,
e.g., JOHN R. GERDY, SPORTS: THE ALL-AMERICAN ADDICTION (2002); Michael
Hirschorn, The Case for Reality TV, The Atlantic, May 2007,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/05/the-case-for-reality-tv/5791/2/. In
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and sports provide familiar shorthand for understanding and explaining how
legal culture operates. Indeed, as a descriptive matter, litigation is easy to
depict as a game: Players and umpires (lawyers and judges) conduct
themselves according to substantive and procedural rules in pursuit of one or
more well-defined goals.16 As in Monopoly or rugby, the competition is
2007, an American Medical Association report encouraged including "video game
addiction" in the DSM-IV (the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders),
noting that as many as 90% of American youth play video games. MOHAMED K. KHAN,
EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS, INCLUDING ADDICTIVE POTENTIAL, OF VIDEO
GAMES, CSAPH Report 12-A-07. This year, the Supreme Court upheld the First
Amendment rights of video game purveyors, overturning a California law attempting to
restrict sales of violent games to minors. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). The ensuing commentary has illuminated the simultaneous
"ambivalence" and dependency that many Americans have around gaming culture.
Virginia Heffernan, How Games Steer Us Through Life, N. Y. TIMES, July 2, 2011,
available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/how-games-steer-us-
through-life/; see also The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Moral Kombat (Comedy
Central television broadcast June 30, 2011), available at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-june-30-201 1/moral-kombat. Even when we are
not playing or watching actual games, we are recasting our lives in ludic terms.
Workplaces today are peopled with teams and coaches who navigate internal and external
obstacles to reach whatever the end goal might be. See, e.g., HANS WESTERBEEK &
AARON SMITH, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP AND THE LESSONS FROM SPORT (2005) (applying
"sport thinking" and game as a metaphor to teach business leadership; presents "the
lessons for business leadership that can be found on the sporting field of play."). News
channels pump out hours of political posturing and debates, moderated by pundits who
serve as temporary referees on various issues, while politicians and think tanks routinely
turn to game theory and sports metaphors to describe policy choices and political
developments. See, e.g., Bush Runs White House with Sports Metaphors, MSNBC July
15, 2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19774480/ns/politics/. Legislatures
formulate solutions to thorny problems using game-theoretic concepts and terminology:
for example, reducing carbon emissions through "cap and trade," distributing FCC
licenses through auctions, or promoting educational reform through increased
competition by way of vouchers. Personal life presents a hotbed of strategic
considerations (e.g., wait three days before calling or two?), see, e.g., Swingers
(Independent Pictures 111996) ("[TJwo days is like industry standard."); and, as everyone
knows, even the sacred family can devolve into power plays over rules, assignments,
rewards, and penalties. See, e.g., AMY CHUA, BATTLE HYMN OF THE TIGER MOTHER
(2011) (detailing strategic approaches to child rearing).
16 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and
Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 225, 237, 239 (1995) ("Some
sports metaphors, like war metaphors, have to do with roles. They portray trial lawyers as
game players, boxers, team members, or forensic athletes. Judges, not surprisingly, are
referees or umpires.") (citations omitted).
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fierce but orderly, and although surprises can happen, all possible moves take
place in carefully demarcated spaces and unfold within well-known
procedural parameters. Most litigants drop out before making it to the finish
line, of course,17 but those who press forward will discover, conclusively and
definitively, who has won and who has lost.' 8
Animating these structural similarities is a rich legal vocabulary filled
with ludic imagery: personal jurisdiction determinations rest on
considerations of "fair play and substantial justice;"' 9 Supreme Court justices
call "balls and strikes" from the bench;20 vertical and horizontal choice of
law considerations often implicate "forum" shopping, the "home field
advantage," and related tactical concerns. 21 Within legal argument itself,
Duncan Kennedy and others have demonstrated that the back-and-forth in
legal rhetoric comprises matched pairings of "argument-bites," clusters, and
support systems that exist within a structured (though not closed) linguistic
space. These analyses parallel the structural comparisons of the law to a
game, because they expose the moves and countermoves within legal
rhetoric, along with the ideological or political goals that animate a given
sequence or establish priorities.
The prevalence of game/sport mindsets in the law signals an intriguing
17 According to the most recent federal court reports, only 1.1% of federal civil
cases filed went to trial. JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COuRTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, 168 (2010) available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics.aspx. State courts reflect similar statistics showing that
about 3% of civil cases are actually disposed of by trial. Lynn Langton & Thomas H.
Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts (2008) available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf.
18 See Thornburg, supra note 16, at 239, 243.
19 International Shoe and its progeny made this term a bulwark of personal
jurisdiction analysis.
20 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the United States, Before the Senate Comm. or the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(Statement of John A. Roberts, Jr., nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States, S.
Hrg. 109-158 at 56 (Sept. 12-15, 2005) (Sept. 14, 2005) (likening a Supreme Court
Justice to an umpire and assuring the Senate that he would "remember that it's my job to
call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat").
21 For commentary on forum shopping, see, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, The
Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 481 (2011); Richard Maloy,
Forum Shopping? What's Wrong With That?, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25 (2005);
Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping
and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769
(1995).
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tension between the law's institutional viability and its normative
commitments to justice and other weighty social values.22 For all the
eagerness to toss around sports metaphors when describing disputes and
transactions, it is still not clear whether the law being like a game is,
ultimately, a good thing. In her analysis of metaphors in the legal system,
Elizabeth Thornburg points out that although courts and commentators
commonly use game and sport metaphors to describe litigation, they often
explicitly recognize that such comparisons are problematic because of the
playful, arbitrary attributes of games. 23 Game metaphors can have multiple
and sometimes conflicting uses in legal texts, standing in for both fair
process (good) and nonserious, cynical tactics (bad).24
A cursory review of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates
this two-mindedness. Some opinions emphasize the difference between
serious legal reasoning and recreational games by pointing out the arbitrary,
childish qualities of games (e.g., "Statutory interpretation is not a game of
22 "The reason for the rules is not that litigation is a game, like golf, with arbitrary
rules to test the skill of the players. Rather, litigation is a 'winnowing process,' and the
procedures for preserving or waiving issues are part of the machinery by which courts
narrow what remains to be decided." Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 531
(1st Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
23 Thomburg, supra note 16, at 237. See also Roscoe Pound, The Causes ofPopular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REv. 729, 739 (1906) ("If
the law is a mere game, neither the players who take part in it nor the public who witness
it can be expected to yield to its spirit when their interests are served by evading it."),
quoted in Skylar Curtis, All's Fair in Love and Procedural Vagueness?, 41 McGEORGE
L. REV. 695, 701 n.1 (2010).
24 This inconstancy is not necessarily a problem to fix, and indeed may be intrinsic
to our legal system. Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia, the "internal
differentiation, the stratification characteristic of any national language," captures the
shifting definitional qualities of words and the inherent instability of language. MIKHAIL
BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS, 67 (Michael Holquist ed. Caryl
Emerson & Michael Holquist trans.) (1982). Following Bakhtin, Daniel Solove notes that
the "plurality of consciousnesses" within a single work can be "combine[d]" but not
"merged." The disparity between the differences ultimately allows for more profound
understanding of the tensions and motivations within positions and postures. Daniel
Solove, Postures of Judging: An Exploration of Judicial Decisionmaking, 9 CARDOZO
STUD. L. & LITERATURE 173, 187 (1997) (citing MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF
DOSTOYEVSKY'S POETICS 6 (Caryl Emerson ed. and.trans.) (5th ed. 1993). Here, the
multiple connotation of games and game metaphors in the law prompts a sort of internal
commentary on the legitimacy of the enterprise - the recognition that judicial decisions
must conform at some level to public rules while also reflecting arbitrary or even morally
objectionable policy choices.
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blind man's bluff.").25 Others criticize opposing positions for failing to be
enough like a game in refusing to adhere to rules (e.g., "Like the chess player
who tries to win by sweeping the opponent's pieces off the table, the Court
simply shuts from its sight the formidable obstacles New Haven would have
faced in defending against a disparate-impact suit."). 26 In both cases, the
Court consciously uses game metaphors to make a normative point, even
though the metaphor itself can, as Professor Thornburg points out, cut in
either normative direction. 27
Games are, accordingly, a sort of ubiquitous split metaphor in the law,
offering an irreconcilable epistemological breach between fairness-as-system
on the one hand and fairness-as-justice on the other-an instance of the
familiar jurisprudential tension between utility and rights. The late Arthur
Allen Leff described this tension as the "ludic metaphor," 28 the powerful
tendency to model legal processes and legitimacy on games and game norms.
Leffs conclusion is straightforward enough-namely, that in a world of
conflict and indeterminacy, games offer much-desired resolution and much-
needed relief-but his reasoning is worth closer examination.
B. The "Ludic Metaphor"
Leff's essay starts with a fictional case study and then extrapolates
observations about that fictional society to modern life, a progression
25 "Judges are free to consider statutory. language in light of a statute's basic
purposes." Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 484, 123 S.Ct. 1655, 155 L.Ed.2d
643 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2706 (2009).
27 Additionally, game-related imagery continues to appear in the purely descriptive
language of opinions. Thus, the Court will speak of "repeat players," Schwab v. Reilly,
130 S. Ct. 2652, 2677 n p.1 5 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); or "alter[ing] the playing
field," Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish
County 554 U.S. 527 (2008); or "giv[ing] the game away" Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010), to describe the factual or legal landscape of a
particular situation, apparently without intending any additional normative subtext.
28 Arthur Allen Leff, Law And, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978) [hereinafter Law And].
Leff's essay begins, appropriately enough, with some wordplay. The title, "Law And," is
a disconnected conjunction, an abruptly snapped-off reference to the increasing
interdisciplinary approaches emerging in or around the 1970s-the "law and" schools,
such as law and economics, law and literature, law and psychology-without focusing on
one particular methodology. The title foregrounds the existence of legal interdisciplinary
studies while simultaneously erasing the explanatory power of any one of those
disciplines.
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apparently modeled on law and anthropology. 29 This structure allows Leff to
make some general remarks about social ordering, many of which resonate
within the larger body of Leff's scholarship, before proposing the "ludic
metaphor" as an alternative organizing principle.
Leff's pseudo-anthropological case study is the "Jondo," a fictional tribe
with elaborate rules about hunting, gathering, sharing, and compensating:
This tribe is so primitive that it has divided itself into only two moieties, or
subgroups, totemically specified as the Fish-Jondo and the Maize-Jondo ...
. On two occasions, however, all the Jondo come together. One jointure
occurs "when the Great Cod enters the Maize Ear," that is, when the moon
rises full in a particular constellation of stars that the Jondo call the "Maize
Ear." This celestial event normally occurs in early autumn, and when the
sky so arranges itself, all the Fish-Jondo cross to the Maize-Jondo side of
the village, help with the maize harvest, and celebrate with a big post-
gleaning party. 30
Some years the moonrise does not correspond with the growing season, and
when that happens, part of the harvest unfortunately is lost. But if "heaven
and earth are too much out of phase" and "it begins to look as if all of a
particular harvest might be lost," the Jondo "declare the moon 'bewitched,'
and order the temporary merger of all the Jondo" to reap the remaining
maize, despite the Maize Ear's nonappearance. 31 In this way, the Jondo
retain some semblance of cosmological integrity while making sure they do
not starve. 32
From this description, Leff concludes that human activity generally does
not insist on the rigors of metaphysics or cosmology, preferring instead to
track religious doctrines rather loosely and take detours when certain
economic constraints come into play. Likewise, human activity is not fully
explainable through efficiency, since people sometimes choose to do things
for religious reasons, even though those choices may not maximize welfare.
29 For a similarly pitched introduction to anthropological analysis of modem
America, see Horace Miner, Body Ritual Among the Nacirema, 58 AMERICAN
ANTHROPOLOGIST 503 (1956). Many thanks to Michelle McKinley for this reference.30 Law And, supra note 28, at 989-90.
3 1 Id. at 990.
32 It is much more complicated than this. Leff also documents the Jondo's fishing
rituals, their food storage conventions, the society's tort claims against food thieves, and
the "Sacred Hermaphrodite," the Jondo's chief judicial officer and the overseer of the
tribe's dispute resolution. Id. at 989-93.
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Put another way, many people will give up some economic efficiencies to
"preserve the elegance of their cosmic vision" but also will not take an
extreme hard line on religion if doing so will bring them to the point of
physical discomfort. 33 Leff notes that the Jondo, like people generally, do not
examine the tension between these competing worldviews and will not admit
that their primary way of seeing the world, whether cosmological or
efficiency-based, may be subject to change.34
After analyzing the Jondo's primary rituals, Leff then turns to "the
workings of a real society," as demonstrated by the "Usa" tribe. The Usa are
much more complex than the Jondo, with "countless classes" of citizens and
"a vast network of distribution, allocation, production, and exchange." To
resolve disputes among these diverse constituencies within this complex
array of transaction and exchange, the Usa have come up with the Usa Trial,
an ornate pageant of Champions and Judges and Helpers, complete with
"peculiar costume[s]," "archaic honorifics," "large and imposing" rooms, and
"elaborate deference ceremonies." Though the process is intricate, the
outcomes are rather enervated. "For instance, if the dispute involves the
proper understanding of complex communications between two parties over
time, the Judge and his helpers will likely behave as if the only
interpretations available are (a) contract or (b) no contract." 35
33 Id. at 993.
34 Exploring the tension between worldviews was one of the hallmarks of Leff's
scholarship, which often expressed considerable doubt as to whether we can identify or
assemble an external moral foundation for the law, whether through positivism or
efficiency or imaginative liberal reforms. In a series of provocative articles, Leff pointed
out that our desire for (and fear of) "complete, transcendent, and immanent set of
propositions about right and wrong" is understandable but nonetheless doomed: "The so-
called death of God turns out not to have been just His funeral; it also seems to have
effected the total elimination of any coherent or even more-than-momentarily convincing,
ethical or legal system dependent upon finally authoritative, extrasystematic premises."
Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1229,
1232 (1979) [hereinafter Unspeakable Ethics] (emphasis in original). Because no
extrasystematic authority exists or can be proved to exist, any normative statement is
irrevocably compromised by the fact that the speaker is unable to validate the premises of
his normative statement outside the confines of his own experience and existence. At the
end of the day, any normative or moral command-do this, don't do that-cannot
overcome the ultimate rejoinder: "sez who?" Id. at 1230; see also Arthur Allen Leff,
Memorandum, 29 STAN. L. REv. 879 (1977).
35 Law And, supra note 28, at 997. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When
Litigation is Not the Only Way: Consensus Building and Mediation as Public Interest
Lawyering, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37, 39-42 (2002) (discussing the shortcomings of
adversarial adjudication); Harry T. Edwards, Hopes and Fears for Alternative Dispute
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Simplifying infinitely complex disputes may seem incompatible with
individual justice yet such simplification is one of the primary mechanisms
for dispensing justice among the Usa. In this way, Leff argues, the Trial is
most easily understood, not through efficiency rationales or cosmology, but
through the 'ludic metaphor'-that is, as a. game. 36 Games have rules,
boundaries, and clearly demarcated roles; what's more, games create a closed
system that yields a particular subset of possible results: "it is a joy
independent of victory to be engaged 'in. an activity that allows for a
determinate result. Even clearly losing may, at least some of the time, be a
pleasant alternative to a lifetime of never knowing."37 Such a view is
consonant with the findings of pr6cedural justice studies that suggest that
people are more concerned with the process than with the result.38 Without
God around to make decisions and res6lve disputes, legal "games" provide a
sort of local option for determining who should win a given encounter.
To create this determinate space in an.indeterminate world, the Usa must
reduce the insuperable complexities of conflict into roles, processes, and
outcomes. In the Trial, as in all games, the determinacy of outcomes exists
within the framework of the exercise. Arbitrary decisions or impermissible
moves within a rule-bound process do not lead to determinate outcomes,
regardless of who is making the moves. The rules themselves are "absolutely
binding during any play thereof. They are not open to question in any
nongame terms-justness, for instance, or legitimacy or efficiency-for they
do not so much regulate the activity as constitute it." 39 Such determinacy is
especially important in trials because "the Trial actually allocates things of
material and emotional value" and determinacy helps preserve a sense of
fairness and legitimacy, without which the participants may lose respect for
Resolution, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 425, 426 (1985) (addressing the inadequacies of the
judicial system and adjudication by trial); Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?
68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982) (discussing the shortfalls of litigation and encouraging non-
adversarial decisionmaking).
36 As Leff puts it: "A game is an activity in terms of which. you can know with some
precision what you did and how you came out." Law And, supra note 28, at 1000.
3 7 Id. at 1001.
38 See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (finding that people are more interested in issues of process
than in issues of outcome); see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler,
Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and
Integrative Potential, 33 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 473 (2008).
39 Law And, supra note 28, at 1000.
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and confidence in the process.40 Reducing complex human affairs to a game
satisfies our cosmological leanings by appealing to cultural norms and values
(e.g., fairness and merit) while attending to economic concerns, say, by
applying competitive processes for resource allocation.41
Leff s ludic metaphor is a useful theoretical construct because it
encompasses three separate but interrelated angles on games in the law. First,
as a descriptive matter, Leff's metaphor captures the structural similarities
between recreational games and litigation. Both games and the legal system
use rules, roles, and processes to identify winners and losers. Although the
law is not just a game, as Leff says, it is "not not a game -either"; 42 its
legitimacy comes, in large part, from the game-like constraints that govern
legal actors and procedures.
Second, the ludic metaphor provides insight into why society would
choose to fashion its legal system as a high-stakes game. As Leff points out,
people want certainty and finality, and those needs are especially pressing
with respect to institutions that are supposed to deliver justice to disputants.
Accordingly, the legal system cannot be conflicted and indecisive, but must
dispense substantive outcomes that have at least. procedural integrity. Casting
dispute resolution processes as.games provides for this procedural integrity
(i.e., if rules are not followed, outcomes are not valid) and supplies definitive
outcomes, even if those outcomes do not feel wholly satisfactory.
Third, and relatedly, Leff characterizes the ludic metaphor as an
alternative epistemological framework to other possible frameworks, such as
the Usa's efficiency .analyses or the Jondo's cosmology. Put another way,
games. are strategic or contingent, but not definitional or essential, concepts.
In fact, Leff concludes his essay with the modest suggestion that we are
captive to the ideological and experiential forces in which we find ourselves
and that, in the final analysis, the ludic metaphor is merely the tip of the
iceberg, one of an "infinity more" competing teleologies, as "mysteriously
generated and interpenetrated" as the ludic and material planes,
interconnected with each other in a "composite of Webs" creating an
40 Id. at 1005.
41 "It is, after all, inherently implausible -that an epistemological inquiry in the form
of an agonistic game maximizes thoroughness and accuracy of factual determination [that
is, efficiency]." Id. at 1003-04. See also, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Products Liability: A
Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REv.. 103 (1970) (arguing that economic analysis is
inadequate in and of itself to describe liability law).
42 Law And, supra note 28, at 1005.
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"enormous crystal lattice" of meaning.43 "[A]ll we can understand, and that
not very well, are the games we ourselves generate and eventually, but
predictably, lose." For Leff, not only is the trial a game, but legal scholarship
and indeed all attempts at epistemological order are games, with scholars
engaged in the endless project of imagining and reimagining the structure
and logic of legal institutions through game metaphors and the terminology
of rules, roles, processes, and outcomes. 44
C. Using Leff's Gameframe in Alternative Contexts
Arthur Allen Leff is not known for his dystopian theory or for
scholarship on alternative processes. 45 His essay on the ludic metaphor in the
law, however, provides a useful foundation for an analysis of dystopian
themes in the modern ADR landscape.
Law, like the wider culture, has come to rely upon and even celebrate
games as a way to explain itself to itself and others. In contrast, the idea of
"ADR as game" is not immediately intuitive and to some may be repugnant.
Although many ADR practitioners and scholars would readily admit that a
structured process governs alternative dispute resolution, they might not
agree that these process elements constitute a game. This is because part of
the ADR ethos is an earnestness about the problem-solving venture, a
commitment to taking a more enlightened view of dispute resolution that
allows for creativity and outside-the-box thinking that would not be
permissible in a traditional litigation format.46 Additionally, ADR
43 Id. at 1010-11. "And even that would be a simplifying lie, for it would share with
the one-web metaphor, and with my two-plane redaction, the same mendacious tendency
(which, I suppose, is the defining falsehood of all scholarship): to see all that is as in
theory understandable. In effect, scholarship represents the ludic move raised to its
highest power by acting as if reality itself can actually be played to a determinate
conclusion." Id.
44 See also Arthur A. Leff, Afterword, 90 YALE L.J. 1296 (1981) ("[T]o have
crafted, on occasion, something true and truly put-whatever the devil else legal
scholarship is, is from, or is for, it's the joy of that too.").
45 Leff did, however, propose the use of an impartial "referee" in negotiations and
refer to it as mediation. Arthur A. Leff, Injury, Ignorance, and Spite-The Dynamics of
Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 44 (1970). It was a passing reference and he
sounded dubious whether it would work.
46 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 795 (1984) ("Although
litigants typically ask for relief in the form of damages, this relief is actually a proxy for
more basic needs or objectives. By attempting to uncover those underlying needs, the
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practitioners are typically not advocates but are neutrals or designers; roles
that attempt to resist the ideological capture or partisanship that contributes
to ludic dynamics in the legal system. Finally, because ADR structures are
more flexible and because self-determination is such an important theoretical
element of ADR processes, the idea that there are bounded spaces, restrictive
procedures, and highly scripted or formalized roles is not as resonant in an
ADR context. Put another way, ADR is special because it is not a game,
specifically not the game of litigation; it is the antithesis of that game at both
ideological and practical levels. Calling ADR a game would, for many ADR
proponents, devalue their commitment to the ideals of the profession and
simply would not ring true in the same way that "the law is a game" does.
Leff s ludism, however, does not require the game itself to think of itself
as a game. The Jondo, after all, were perfectly content to exist in the
borderland between cosmology and efficiency, and did not seek categorical
purity in any event. ADR may be a game in spite of itself, not because of its
goals, but because of its institutionality. As in legal games, ADR processes
have roles, rules, and objectives. Additionally, as in legal games, ADR
processes attempt to provide some measure of determinacy to participants.
Unlike legal games, which invariably end in winners and losers, many
alternative approaches vaunt a win-win framework that attempts to transcend
zero-sum thinking and outcomes. Nevertheless, even this twist on traditional
ludic endings is itself a ludic ending.
Take mediation, for example. Mediation "involves the intervention of an
acceptable, impartial, and neutral third party who has no authoritative
decision-making power to assist contending parties in voluntarily reaching
problem-solving model presents opportunities for discovering greater numbers of and
better quality solutions."). Some commentators, however, have pointed out increasing
game-oriented approaches in ADR practice. See, e.g., J. Thomas Presby, Practice Ideas
for Mediators Who Focus on Commercial Disputes, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF
LITIGATION, Apr. 2003, at 69 ("The parties and their lawyers often will use the mediator
to bluff the other side with artificial positions, demands, and threats to withdraw. This
sort of gamesmanship is something that the mediator must recognize. . . ."); Karen M.
Goodman, Ethics in Settlement: Lawyer Gamesmanship and Misrepresentations During
Negotiations 1 (2001), available at
http://www.bnabooks.com/ababna/nr/2001/goodman.doc ("[S]ettlement negotiations,
including structured ADR proceedings, frequently resemble WWF wrestling matches in
terms of gamesmanship, misrepresentation and coercive tactics."); John W. Cooley,
Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1997) ("It is rare that
caucused mediation, a type of informational game, occurs without the use of deception by
the parties, by their lawyers, and/or by mediators in some form.. .. The confluence of
the[] initially unaligned strategies, tactics, and goals creates an environment rich in
gamesmanship and intrigue.").
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their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute." 47 In
mediation, participants attempt to work through their issues in the presence
of a neutral who guides the process, gives everyone a chance to speak and
encourages everyone to listen, recasts charged emotional language into
neutral language, assists participants in working through differences, and
facilitates problem solving and dispute resolution.48 This process maps
directly onto Leff's ludic metaphor. Like legal games, the mediation process
has familiar "moves"--among them the mediator's introductory statement,
the uninterrupted time for each participant to speak, the development of
interests and perhaps of a "focusing question," caucuses, and the creation of
the final agreement, if one is reached-and defined roles for the participants.
As a formal matter, Leff's definition of "game" is quite elastic, and so
transposi'ng mediation's process elements onto that definition is not difficult.
More challenging, perhaps, is seeing the relationship between mediation
and Leff' assertion that games simplify disputes to promote greater certainty
and determinacy. Mediation, after all, is not confined to issues of legal
relevance but instead may encompass a breadth of possible concerns, such as
the way people treat one another outside the mediation. Moreover, as a
voluntary process, mediation emphasizes the participation and contribution
of everyone involved. This means cultivating an environment that can
tolerate multiple conflicting perspectives without needing to endorse, from a
process perspective, one interpretation over another.49 Finally, the mediated
outcome is, ideally, the joint product of the parties' own problem-solving.
Because the parties know their own resources and interests better than
anyone else, they can customize their outcome to their particular situations.50
47 CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 6 (1986); see also Michael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the
Dimensions ofDefinition, 10 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 69, 79-81 (2005) (demonstrating the
multiple and sometimes incommensurate descriptive and prescriptive notions that inform
definitions of "mediation").
48 See MOORE, supra note 47, at 25-26 (detailing general and specific mediator
moves).
49 In fact, some mediation approaches explicitly recognize the validity of each
participant's own multiple and conflicting narratives. See JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD
MONK, PRACTICING NARRATIVE MEDIATION: LOOSENING THE GRIP OF CONFLICT 7 (2008)
("[P]eople are always situated within multiple story lines .... We do not have a bias in
favor of integrating a person's multiple story lines into a singular or congruent whole, as
some psychologies would argue one should.").
50 Mediation thus redefines the process with respect to the parties themselves, not to
generic process-to-dispute matching in the aggregate. Writing in the context of whether
private negotiated settlements are preferable to public adjudicated results, Carrie Menkel-
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In these ways, mediation resists the reductive determinacy that litigation
promises; rather, mediation is supposed to be a creative, pluralistic process
that facilitates agreement without imposing outcomes.
Yet, it is also in these same ways that mediation ultimately creates its
own determinate space. Arguably the role of the mediator is to help convert
the infinite and overdetermined chaotic mass of data informing the actual
relationship and conflict into something more manageable and. ultimately
determinate. This can happen in a variety of ways: through the imposition of
a process that models a particular kind of problem solving;5 through
restating questions and assertions; through recasting charged language into
neutral terms that help explain or investigate the comment's substance and
emotional overtones. 52 Even though this conversion may not be as drastically
limiting as in legal games, it is necessarily limiting. What's more, these
intentional limits and process determinacy are there by design; no one would
find mediation useful without some definition and management of the
disputes at hand.
In fact, one might argue that mediation actually offers more potential
determinacy than the Trial: instead of a dissatisfying "contract/no contract"-
type outcome that ignores the situational complexities of the dispute,
mediation presents an opportunity for a holistic, wide-ranging solution that
may incorporate multiple interests into an elegant, creative agreement or may
lay the groundwork for a transformative experience around the relationship
between the parties. 53 The romantic mystique of mediation, after all, is that it
addresses multiple layers of personal and interpersonal concerns, including
Meadow states, "For me, the question is not 'for or against' settlement (since settlement
has become the 'norm' for our system), but when, how, and under what circumstances
should cases be settled? When do our legal system, our citizenry, and the parties in
particular disputes need formal legal adjudication, and when are their respective interests
served by settlement, whether public or private?" Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose
Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some
Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2664-65 (1995) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis
omitted).
51 For example, even some facilitative mediation styles feature the "focusing
question," in which the mediator attempts to synthesize the parties' issues into one
proposition for analysis.
52 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 47, at 130 (recommending that mediators can
manage "unproductive venting" by "encourag[ing] or suggest[ing] ways that disputants
can express the same concerns in a less volatile manner").
53 See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 49; see also ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH &
JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 29 (1994) ("The goal is a world in which
people are not just better off but better: more human and more humane.").
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but not limited to the precise issues at hand, through the guidance of the
mediator:
[O]ne sees a figure sitting with the parties, her hands reaching towards each
of them as if to support them in telling their tale or to caution them in
listening to each other to weigh the matter more carefully. . . .The figure is
not alone or aloof. Her outstretched arms form a bridge between the parties,
so that communication and positive energy can flow again. ... The
mediator's features are hazy, since the focus and light remains on the
disputing parties. Her presence, however, exudes optimism, respect, and
confidence in the parties' capacity. She brings an energetic and urgent sense
that justice can be done by the parties' own hands. 54
These comments are admittedly idealized but nonetheless familiar
background strains in mediation and alternative processes generally. Indeed,
alternative processes often make the psychospiritual and social aspects of
dispute resolution (such as peace building, active listening, empathy,
assertiveness, cooperation, and so on) primary focuses of the process. To a
postmodern Western audience, the idea of "alternative dispute resolution"
may bring to mind comforting utopian visions of dispute resolution
characterized by peaceful exchange, self-expression, empathy, self-
determination, process control and impartiality, autonomy, tailor-made
solutions, choice, and consent.55 These are the same familiar desires that
make legal ludism as prevalent and inescapable as Leff describes.
Mediation, therefore, is a game. And it is not hard to imagine how other
forms of ADR correspond to the formal elements (rules, roles, processes) and
purpose (providing psychospiritual comfort in the face of radical
indeterminacy) of games. The ludic nature of mediation and ADR, however,
is not as apparent as that of the legal system, because the formal elements are
often more malleable and the potential determinacy benefits are much more
54 Lela P. Love, Images ofJustice, 1 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 29, 31-32 (2000).
55 Recent innovations in transformative and narrative mediation are not to the
contrary. These efforts underscore the commitment to determinacy by providing a more
nuanced view of process that appreciates the irreconcilable complexities of the multiple
discourages preceding and then coming out of the mediation. What these approaches do,
at a meta level, is synthesize these complexities into a "story" or narrative that stitches
together the incommensurate disputes into a sort of tapestry. This is not "resolution" at
the micro level, but is the installation of a way of perceiving conflict. WINSLADE &
MONK, supra note 49, at 32 ("The path forward may feature a range of possible
outcomes.... Our focus is therefore on the creation of a sustainable, forward-moving
narrative.").
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profound. As a result, ADR may not seem like a game but as something more
than a game, which may make it more difficult to conceptualize and assess.
Yet, merely pointing out that ADR is a game does not, ultimately, get us
very far. Leff's ludic metaphor does not provide any normative guidance on
the emergence of institutional games of dispute resolution, legal or
otherwise. Although the imaginative pseudo-anthropological narrative
structure of "Law And" encourages the reader to reconsider the assumptions
and motivations that animate modem legal and ADR games, and although
comparing legal scholarship to a game suggests that professors should not
take themselves too seriously, the essay does not go much farther than that.
Leff's work resonates more on the personal level, and the concentric circles
that he draws-from the fictional Jondo, to the "Usa" tribe, to the "tribe of
scholars"-are not so much a social critique as an inwardly directed
extrapolation, a meditation on mind and identity.
As the next Part explains, the dystopian project has similar game-
oriented imaginings, but turns these devices outward to engage the historical
moment, often with an explicitly normative cast. In this way, perhaps,
dystopian "game theory" supplies the externally-focused, normative
dimension missing from Leff's essay.
III. GAMES AND DYSTOPIA
Alternative processes may be games, but how could they ever be hunger
games? Even the most ardent detractor of ADR would likely not describe
alternative processes as a grisly deathmatch between weapon-toting children.
Before considering whether the term "Hunger Games" has any useful
application in alternative contexts, then, we must first consider what it
means.
To that end, this part examines the intersection between dystopianism
and legal games. Not all games are bad, and not all dystopian fiction is about
the law. At the juncture of dystopian stories and legal games, however, are
the bad games, the "Hunger Games"-the futuristic legal and political
structures that oppress society through familiar game norms and constructs,
such as institutional settings and spaces, established roles, and procedural
rules. Seeing how these bad games emerge in dystopian literature about law
provides an interpretive context for thinking through dystopian possibilities
in alternative practice.
Like the previous part, this part begins with a brief overview of the
relevant theory within the context of legal culture. Dystopian imagery and
allusions are familiar and culturally resonant rhetorical moves in legal
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argument, because they-much like games themselves-pull abstractions
into high, ultra-real relief, apparently exposing both the internal dynamics of
a given situation along with potential outcomes. The part then looks more
closely at the game-oriented dimension of dystopian stories, as a formal and
normative matter, and then examines how these stories illuminate persistent
legal problems using games. Finally, the part suggests an analytical entry
point to assessing the possible dystopian implications of the proliferation of
alternative dispute resolution processes. By engaging present concerns and
reorienting the analysis around future bad outcomes, dystopianism
establishes both normative and kinetic dimensions for Leff's ludic metaphor.
As a kinetic matter, dystopian imaginings about the future may provide the
rationale for changing from one game to the next; as a normative matter,
dystopianism acts as a lens through which to evaluate this change.
A. Dystopian Rhetoric in the Law
Most are familiar with basic dystopian rhetoric. Any argument that plays
out the possible bad effects of a course of action is, at a broad level,
dystopian. Moreover, most recognize popular dystopian references-for
example, BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU 56-that evoke the deep,
collective anxieties about excessive governmental (or corporate) control, loss
of privacy, ascendancy of technology, and diminished individuality that are
so often the themes of dystopian works. Dystopian fiction like The Hunger
Games offers futuristic critiques of current realities, often identifying
technology and political "progress" (typically, capitalist or totalitarian
utopian visions) as present-day seeds of dangerous future developments.57
56 ORWELL, supra note 12, at 3.
5 See, e.g., THEODORE DALRYMPLE, OUR CULTURE, WHAT'S LEFT OF IT: THE
MANDARINS AND THE MASSES 104 (2005) ("[T]he dystopians' purpose is moral and
political. They are not crystal gazing but anxiously--despairingly--commenting on the
present. The dystopias-depicting journeys to imaginary worlds, removed more in time
than in space, whose most salient characteristics are exaggerations of what their authors
take to be significant social trends-are the reductio ad absurdum (or ad nauseam) of
received ideas of progress and sensitive indicators of the anxieties of their age, which is
still so close to our own."); see also Gorman Beauchamp, Zamiatin 's We, in No PLACE
ELSE: EXPLORATIONS IN UTOPIAN AND DYSTOPIAN FICTION 56, 56 (Eric S. Rabkin et al.
eds., 1983) ("The dystopian novel, in formulating its warning about the future, fuses two
modern fears: the fear of utopia and the fear of technology."). What makes "utopian
ideations" so ominous now is that they are "not only possible, but perhaps inevitable,
given the increasing array of techniques for social control made available by our
science." Id.
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Typically at stake are liberal values such as personal freedom, choice, and
consent; in many imagined dystopian futures, state or corporate tyrants
perfect their power by transforming people into cogs within the state or
corporate apparatus.58
Part of what makes dystopian rhetoric so effective is the dystopian
"technique of defamiliarization" or "cognitive estrangement," through which
dystopian novelists exaggerate and distort familiar structures and settings to
provide "fresh perspectives on problematic social and political practices that
might otherwise be taken for granted or considered natural or inevitable." 59
In Zamyatin's totalitarian United States in We, for example, citizens follow a
detailed daily itinerary that includes activities for every hour of the day,
including the special "pink check" time during which a person can schedule
any other person for sexual relations.60 Organizing one's time around
productive activities seems like a productive, mostly benign goal until the
schedule itself begins to transform the schedulees into interchangeable,
deindividuated subjects. Likewise, Takami's absurdly violent Battle Royale
transfers a set of junior high school students-all experiencing the typical
anxieties and resentments associated with the pre-teen years, but
unfortunately living within a brutally repressive futuristic Japan-onto a
weapon-stocked deserted island, with predictably grisly results.61 For its part,
58 See EUGENE ZAMYATIN, WE 6 (1924) ("Then the thought came: why beautiful?
Why is the dance beautiful? Answer: because it is an unfree movement."); see also
Thomas P. Dunn & Richard D. Erlich, A Vision of Dystopia, Beehives and
Mechanization, 33 J. OF GEN. EDUC. 45, 57 (1981) (arguing that the dystopian society
promotes "stability and rational order" through the "triumph of the mechanical hive" and
the destruction of personal freedom).
59 M. KEITH BOOKER, THE DYSTOPIAN IMPULSE IN MODERN LITERATURE: FICTION
AS SOCIAL CRITICISM 19 (1994).
60 ZAMYATIN, supra note 58, at 22 (explaining the 300-year-old Lex Sexualis: "A
Number may obtain a license to use any other Number as a sexual product.").
61 KOuSHUN TAKAMI, BATTLE ROYALE (1999). The movie version, directed by
legendary Japanese filmmaker Kinji Fukasaku, was quite controversial in Japan and has
not yet been released in the United States. Robert Ito, Lesson Plan: Kill or Be Killed,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/09/movies/09ito.html. The film has attracted critical
attention and gained cult status and critical acclaim since its Japanese release in 2000.
See, e.g., Friddric Neyrat, A Sovereign Game: On Kinji Fukasaku's Battle Royale (2001),
in TRANSLATION, BIOPOLrrICS, COLONIAL DIFFERENCE (Naoki Sakai & Jon Solomon eds.,
2006) (analyzing the narrative with respect to the "void of Japanese institutions incapable
of achieving the very goals that bring them to life"); Linda Hoaglund, Battle Royale:
Kinji Fukasaku's cautionary allegory, 2 PERSIMMON 48-55 (Winter 2002) (describing
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The Hunger Games uses reality television, a staple of modem TV fare, as the
strategic centerpiece of post-technological state oppression. It is the
grotesque refashioning of the familiar that attracts and then alarms the reader
of dystopian fiction, who at some point breaks away from the story and
thinks: Wait, could this really happen?
Legal argumentation also draws on dystopian pathos through cognitive
estrangement, most notably through the "parade of horribles." The parade of
horribles is a rhetorical device that imagines the awful consequences of a
particular course of action.62 In Alli v. United States,63 for example, landlord
plaintiffs sued the United States for breach of contract when the Department
for Housing and Urban Development (HUD) suspended and terminated the
plaintiffs' housing assistance payment for failing to maintain acceptable
residential conditions. Finding for the defendant, Judge Allegra vividly
described the plaintiffs' rental properties:
Picture again these unpleasant images. A bathroom with an umbrella
hanging upsidedown to catch water leaking through a gaping hole in the
ceiling. Other erstwhile bathrooms with exposed and deteriorating floor
boards; buckled, molded and mildewed tiling, some with empty holes where
plumbing once existed. Kitchens with broken and missing counters,
cabinetry with no doors (some dangling from the walls), roach-infested and
rusted refrigerators, and other nonfunctional appliances. Plastered walls and
tiled ceilings in dimly-lit hallways, so dilapidated, water-damaged and
partially-collapsed as to appear cave-like. Outside doors left off their
hinges, cracked masonry, and roofs and flashing no longer impermeable, all
exposing residents to the elements. A basement filled with feces and
vermin, the latter an army so plentiful that those who enter unprotected
how the experience of subtitling the film provided insight into competing impulses in
Japanese culture with respect to social revolution).
62 The "parade of horribles" is a rhetorical device meant to highlight the
unavoidably awful implications of a particular course of action. The device provides
critical distance on the instant question, not on the central metaphors of law itself:
Commentators have used numerous different metaphors to refer to arguments that
have this rough form. For example, people have called such arguments "wedge" or
"thin edge of the wedge," "camel's nose" or "camel's nose in the tent," "parade of
horrors" or "parade of horribles," "domino," and "this could snowball" arguments.
All of these metaphors suggest that allowing one practice or policy could lead us to
allow a series of other practices or policies.
Eric Lode, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1469,
1470-71 (1999) (citations omitted).
63 Alli v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 250 (Fed. Cl. 2008).
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immediately become infested. And, at least on one January day, elderly and
little children huddled in coats and blankets around open ovens trying to
keep warm in subfreezing temperatures. Scenes from a dystopian novel
about a post apocalyptic world? No, we now know that these graphic
pictures are of the dwellings at issue in this case. 64
Judge Allegra's parade of horribles (here, not an imagined list but rather a
description of actual photographic exhibits) 65 and reference to "a dystopian
novel" at the end of the passage connect the present-day situation of the
Allis' unfortunate tenants with the fictional future oppressed who appear in
dystopian stories. Such rhetoric ripples outward, from the initial justification
of the judgment for defendants to the legal and moral rebuke of the plaintiffs
to the more general broadcast to the public that in some places the present
situation has become unacceptable and change must happen.
Along with the parade of horribles and similar dystopian devices, judicial
opinions draw on the cultural currency of particular dystopian works. The
works of George Orwell, Aldous Huxley, Ray Bradbury, Franz Kafka, and
Margaret Atwood have provided persuasive levers in judicial writing. Like
the parade of horribles, dystopian literary allusions in judicial opinions have
internal/case-specific and external/society-specific acoustics 66 in describing
encroachments of technology, 67 "Orwellian" invasions of privacy, 68 the
64 Id. at 278.
65 Id. at 252.
66 For more on the assertion that an opinion might have different and possibly
conflicting acoustic properties depending on intended audiences, see Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 625 (1984).
67 See, e.g., State v. Martin, 955 A.2d 1144, 1154 (Vt. 2008) ("A few opinions lend
support to defendants' argument, envisioning an inexorable march from DNA databases
like Vermont's to a dystopian future of eugenics, gene-based discrimination, and other
horribles worthy of Aldous Huxley") (citing U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 847, 851 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (stating that "we all have reason to fear that the
nightmarish worlds depicted in films such as Minority Report [in which genetically
altered 'precognitives' are able to see into the future] and Gattaca [in which the
protagonist purchases a superior genetic identity in order to be chosen for a mission to
Saturn] will become realities" (quotation and citation omitted)) (alterations in original));
Banks v. U.S., 490 F.3d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that some characterize
federal DNA statutes as a "police state reminiscent of ... 1984.").
68 See, e.g., Tumage v. Kasper, 307 Ga. App. 172, 173 (2010).
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constraint of personal freedoms, 69 the arbitrariness of law enforcement, 70 the
loss of transparency in the public sphere,71 worst case scenarios and perverse
incentives in public and private ordering,72 and procedural anomalies that
lead to "Kafka-esque" situations featuring hapless citizens caught in the
soulless machinery of the legal system. 73 These opinions use dystopian
references as a literary device, a rhetorical flourish that defends (or worries
about) the decision in the instant case while giving voice to the fears that
attend new developments of modem social and political life.74
69 See, e.g., Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 45 So.3d 836, 858 (Fla. App. 3d Dist.
2010) (Cortifias, J., dissenting) ("The majority would allow governments to regulate the
types of personal-use vehicles their citizens drive simply based on their outward
appearance. Such a holding embraces George Orwell's dystopia, where personal rights
are subverted by the government.").
70 See, e.g., In re L.G.T., 214 P.3d 1, 18-19 (Or. App. 2009).
71 See, e.g., State v. Moralez, 242 P.3d 223, 248 (Kan. App. 2010) (Atcheson, J.,
dissenting) ("We did not form a society that permits those possessed of guns and badges
to randomly or selectively detain citizens upon caprice or chimera. In that society, law
enforcement would trade upon tactics we customarily ascribe to antidemocratic juntas or
Orwellian dystopias.").
72 This is not to say that the court is always convinced by dystopian arguments. See,
e.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 2009 WL 1046016, at *4 (E.D. 2009)
("[T]his Court is not persuaded by Defendants' dystopian conjecture [that allowing
assignments of insurance claims would create perverse incentives].").
7 See, e.g., Blanca P. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1738, 1752-53 (1996)
("[I]t cannot be denied that it is an outrageous injustice to use the fact parents deny they
have committed a horrible act as proof that they did it. That really is Kafkaesque."); see
also Parker B. Potter, Jr., Ordeal by Trial: Judicial References to the Nightmare World of
Franz Kajka, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 195, 195 (2005) (surveying how judges use Kafka to
"criticize bureaucratic absurdity [and] unfair tribunals of all sorts. . .and to empathize
with litigants").
74 Legal scholarship, too, uses both dystopian imagery and allusions to illuminate
and emphasize arguments. See, e.g., Mariel L. Belanger, Amazon.com's Orwellian Gaffe:
The Legal Implications of Sending E-Books Down the Memory Hole, 41 SETON HALL L.
REV. 361 (2011) (using 1984's "memory hole" as a metaphor to describe what happened
when Amazon.com deleted certain books from Kindles); Reza Banakar, In Search of
Heimat: A Note on Franz Kaka's Concept of Law, 22 LAW& LITERATURE 463 (2010)
(incorporating Kafka's fiction, rhetoric, and other writings to analyze the concept of
"heimat" (homeland, native place) in law and human condition); Bob Barr, Aldous
Huxley's Brave New World- Still a Chilling Vision After All These Years, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 847 (2010) (exploring parallels between Huxley's dystopian future and post-9/11
America); D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57
EMORY L.J. 985 (2008) (using Edward Bellamy's utopian novel Looking Backward to
discuss options for corporate decision-making); Keith Aoki, One Hundred Light Years of
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Legal dystopianism, then, enables judges and scholars to reposition their
subjects as being about more than just the immediate issue at hand. A little
goes a long way; however, the typical response to the parade of horribles is
to pronounce it a "parade of horribles," defusing the effectiveness of the
device simply by pointing out its rhetorical nature. All the same, drawing on
the dystopian tradition allows jurists to appeal to common cultural
knowledge and thereby frame arguments that are more emotionally evocative
and persuasive. Such arguments reframe current practices as part of a general
or particular dystopian narrative, which (because we know how these stories
turn out) leaves the reader with the distinct impression that the current
practices are dangerous.
B. Dystopian Versions of Legal Games
The affinity between the law and dystopianism goes farther than
rhetorical imagery and allusions, however. For both legal culture and
dystopian stories, games figure prominently as metaphors and models.
Indeed, R.E. Foust has argued that "[d]ystopian novelists have used the
metaphor of the game extensively because they view humanity sub specie
ludi; that is, as inescapably engaged in the existential game, the serious play,
of history."75 Foust argues that classic dystopian novels "scrupulously and
repeatedly remind[] the reader of the illusion, the playfulness, of the
imaginary experience" through "a complex verbal game of strategies
conducted on several levels." 76 Accordingly, dystopian novelists usually
arrange their narratives as an agonistic game-"the typical dystopian plot
takes the form of a hunt"-and then embed different kinds of games at
different analytical and interpretive levels throughout the story.77 Many
Solitude: The Alternative Futures of LatCrit Theory, 54 RUTGERs L. REv. 1031 (2002)
(examining jurisprudential biases through lens of science fiction); see also Robin West,
Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political
Visions ofFranz KaJka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384 (1985) (using Kafka's
characters to argue that consent is not as autonomous as Posner suggests, but instead is
related to submission to authority).
75 R.E. Foust, A Limited Perfection: Dystopia as Logos Game, XV/3 MOSAIC 79, 87
("Dystopia, then, is a logos game, a fiction which takes language for its subject and
which reminds the reader of the consequences of mistaking desire for reality, fiction for
fact.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
76 Id. at 83.
77 Foust identifies four kinds of games in dystopian literature: the structural game
(overall plot is typically some version of individual versus the state), id. at 83; the
thematic game (characters in the story actually play games), id. at 84; the logos game (the
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dystopian plots, as in The Hunger Games, feature actual games and contests
between characters; additionally, most dystopian fiction contains a "Grand
Inquisitor" scene in which the state, through a highly-placed representative,
verbally spars with the protagonist over whose values and vision for society
are superior.78 Through these interlocking games, the author engages the
reader in a meta-game or "anagogic game," a dialogue about the perilous
implications of society's present course that ideally leads to the reader's
recognition that "mankind's political fictions are just that-fictive" and
therefore political change may still, at least theoretically, be possible. 79
On this view, a dystopian analysis takes the sociopolitical game
structures of the present moment-how the rules work, how the roles are
assigned, who the officials are, what the institutional goals might be-and
then considers the possible future implications of these structures. Dystopian
storylines about the law often repurpose familiar legal games and structures
into tools of domination and control.
Consider, for example, Kafka's short prose parable, "Before the Law." A
man approaches the threshold "to the Law" and, seeing that the gate beyond
stands open, seeks admittance from a doorkeeper. The doorkeeper bids the
man to wait. The man then looks past the doorkeeper down the hall, at which
point the doorkeeper warns the man that there are three fearsome
doorkeepers beyond the gate. So the man waits, occasionally asking to enter
or offering bribes, but never receiving the permission that he believes he
needs to go forward. Finally, enfeebled and near death, the man approaches
the doorkeeper one last time:
"Everyone strives to reach the Law," says the man, "so how does it happen
that for all these many years no one but myself has ever begged for
focus in dystopian stories on control through language and language games), id. at 85-6;
and the anagogic game (the "serious game conducted between the absent author and
present reader" by which the author reminds the reader to "rediscover .., that utopia is a
mental place, a vision of perfection that is ideal only in the imagination"), id. at 86-87.
78 Id. at 86; see also Douglas W. Texter, "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
the Dystopia": The Culture Industry's Neutralization of Stephen King's The Running
Man, 18.1 UTOPIAN STUD. 43, 53 (2007). Catching Fire, the second installment of the
Hunger Games, starts with a Grand Inquisitor scene in which the evil President Snow
tells Katniss that her actions during the Hunger Games have created social upheaval and
she must comply with the Capitol's strategy for quelling the discontent. "Whatever
problems anyone may have with the Capitol, believe me when I say that if it released its
grip on the districts for even a short time, the entire system would collapse." SuZANNE
COLLINS, CATCHING FIRE 21 (2009).
79 Foust, supra note 75, at 86.
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admittance?" The doorkeeper recognizes that the man has reached his end,
and to let his failing senses catch the words, roars in his ear: "No one else
could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you. I am
now going to shut it."
Kafka's dystopian parable illustrates, as does The Trial, the frightening
"judicial indifference"80 to individual rights that attends the development of
modern legal processes and institutions. The doorkeeper who does not open
but instead blocks the door seems like a pretty straightforward representation
of the various obstacles, both institutional and human, to modem justice. The
hard part of the story is the ending: was the man ultimately responsible for
his own failure to go through the door, or is the doorkeeper twisting the knife
one last time?
Kafka's parable can support multiple interpretations, but here is one
possibility: the man follows the rules and observes the authority of
institutional roles without really understanding how these rules and roles
work within the larger justice system; as such, he quietly sacrifices access,
autonomy, and self-reliance so that he can follow what appear to be the rules
and roles of the game.8' It is easy to focus on the doorkeeper's sinister
influence, but that influence is entirely predicated on the man's own
preexisting schemas around game norms, particularly those norms developed
within and alongside institutional law. At the end, the ludic metaphor no
longer describes the law but replaces it, leaving the man unable to do
anything other than follow the arbitrary dictates of a malevolent, though
likely powerless, doorkeeper.
The man in Kafka's parable has internalized the law's game structures so
completely that he is unable to assert any rights to or claims on the legal
system. In dystopian literature, this disempowerment typically extends past
the individual to the larger community. ADR proponents are often
sympathetic to this line of thinking, considering that justifications for ADR
have prominently featured the empowerment and enfranchisement of rights-
holders in disputes. With that in mind, and before moving on from the
80 Potter, supra note 73, at 197.
81 Steven Winter has argued that game metaphors, specifically an "ethic of
spectatorship," may explain the relative passivity of many Americans during the Bush-
Gore recount and subsequent litigation. See Steven L. Winter, When Self-Governance Is a
Game, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 1171, 1204 (2002) ("[O]ne can hardly expect fundamental
values of democracy and self-rule to trump the expectations of the game metaphor when,
in both social spheres, we have internalized a passive ethic of spectatorship and
consumerism.").
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examination of the intersection between dystopianism and legal games, let's
take one more look at The Hunger Games.
1. Internalizing Roles and Rules: The Hunger Games
The first book of The Hunger Games opens on the day of the Reaping,
when each District chooses one girl and one boy to send to the Capitol. These
twenty-four children will fight to the death while their families and friends
watch them (watching is mandated by law) on television. Sixteen-year-old
protagonist Katniss Everdeen, from the poor Seam section of District 12,
describes the scene in the town square:
People file in silently and sign in. The reaping is a good opportunity for the
Capitol to keep tabs on the population as well. Twelve- through eighteen-
year-olds are herded into roped areas marked off by ages, the oldest in the
front, the young.ones, like Prim [Katniss's sister], toward the back. Family
members line up around the perimeter, holding. tightly to one another's
hands. But there are others, too, who have no one they love at stake, or who
no longer care, who slip among the crowd, taking bets on the two kids
whose names will be drawn. Odds are given on their ages, whether they're
Seam or merchant, if they will break down and weep. Most refuse dealing
with the racketeers, but carefully, carefully. These same people tend to be
informers, and who hasn't broken the law?82
When her younger sister is chosen as the girl Tribute for their District,
Katniss immediately volunteers to take her place.
The Reaping scene recalls Shirley Jackson's classic anti-utopian fable
The Lottery83 and the novel's overall premise (social oppression through
entertainment) situates The Hunger Games within a familiar strain of
dystopian fiction and movies, including The Running Man, Rollerball, and
Death Race, and perhaps, to a lesser extent, The Truman Show. 84 In all these
82 SUZANNE COLLINS, THE HUNGER GAMES 16-17 (2008).
83 SHIRLEY JACKSON, THE LOTTERY AND OTHER STORIES 281 (Penguin Books 2009)
(1949).
84 STEPHEN KING, The Running Man, in THE BACHMAN BOOKS 531, 691-92 (New
American Library 1985) (1982); Rollerball (United Artists 1975) (futuristic violent game
meant to control populace by demonstrating futility of individuality); Death Race
(Universal Pictures 2008) (evil corporation makes money from televising prisoners
forced to compete in deadly road race); The Truman Show (Paramount Pictures 1998)
(millions glued to a television show portraying the daily activities of a person who does
not know he is being filmed). This subgenre is particularly interesting because it
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works, the state oppresses its citizens not (only). through raw militaristic
strength, but also through the production and dissemination of graphic
entertainment that depicts and continually replays the subjugation of the
constituent peoples.8 5. Viewing violent games with the state's imprimatur
becomes, on this view, a form of public ritual that reinforces hierarchies of
state power through sensory and ,cognitive manipulation. When Panem
citizens watch a heavily edited television show featuring death matches
between state-chosen participants taking place inside an elaborate state-built
arena, they are convinced not only of the devastatingly all-encompassing
power of the state, but also that the contest participants should, following the
logic of games and contests, be responsible for finding their own way out-
and, should they fail to overcome their opponents, may even deserve their
fate. 86 In fact, through the act of watching,,the spectators become complicit
in the exercise of state power: the television show not only distracts them
from monitoring (and perhaps protesting) state activities more closely, but
also drains away their autonomy and reconstitutes them as passive supporters
of state decisionmaking and control, as evidenced by their inability to turn
away from the show.87
highlights exploitative spectatorship of gratuitous violence as a key component of social
degradation and control-making the reader/watcher complicit in such spectatorship. See
also Series 7: The Contenders (Blow Up Pictures 2001) (six people picked at random
from mandatory national lottery are given guns and forced to hunt and kill one another on
a television show); The Tournament (Buzzfilms 2009) (thirty deadly assassins who fight
to the death to entertairi the world's richest people).
85 The oppressor in classic dystopian works is usually the state; in later postmodern
dystopian fiction, transnational capital and corporations. Texter, supra note 77, at 53.
This Article will use "state" to refer to both kinds of oppressors.
86 Indeed, the poor and disenfranchised are typically the ones who end up in the
arena in these stories, thus solidifying political power in the wealthier classes and
perpetuating social disconnections between the poor and the rich. See, e.g., id. at 55
(pointing out that the televised persecution of poor contestants in The Running Man both
"entertain[s]" the middle class and "assure[s it] that it is not in danger" because those
contestants are always caught and killed by paramilitary actors).
87 Cover asserts that the infamous Milgram experiments from the 1960s
demonstrated that the individual's ability to react and respond "autonomously" (as
opposed to "agentically," or in compliance with authority) tracks with the relative degree
of spectatorship involved. People watching judicially-imposed violence are more likely to
accept the violence as legitimate than they would if the violent acts lacked the state's
imprimatur. Cover, supra note 3, at 1614-15. When researchers replicated the Milgram
experiments in 2008, more than forty years after the original tests took place, the same
results held: seventy percent of participants were willing to administer apparently painful
shocks (more than 150 volts) on the instruction of the "authority figure" running the
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Spectatorship and passivity are important elements of the modem ludic
metaphor within the legal context, presenting difficult problems for
democratic governance and civic identity. As Cover points out, when the
public observes the judge performing an interpretive (and thus violent) act, it
not only receives the judge's "understanding of the normative world" but
also "loses its capacity to think and act autonomously."88 This is because the
audience, following game norms, is relegated to the role of passive spectator
and therefore cannot interfere in ongoing gameplay. In terms of oppressive
schemes, this is creative and effective: convince the mass of people that ludic
norms dictate that they refrain from intervening in violence. Such learned
passivity weakens social norms around engagement, activism, and
democracy. 89 The dystopian state preserves its power by making sure that the
mass of people believe that they can do nothing about the state's choices. 90
Indeed, the television audience is the primary focus of the Gamemakers.
When once Katniss and Peeta, the other Tribute from District 12, arrive at the
Capitol, they meet the "prep team" who scrub, polish, and costume the
contestants. Before the Games begin, the Tributes parade through a series of
pageants and interviews in a frenzied media build-up to the main event. All
this hoopla has given rise to some critical grumbling; as one commentator
put it, "[a]s a tool of practical propaganda, the [G]ames don't make much
experiment. Adam Cohen, Four Decades After Milgram, We're Still Willing To Inflict
Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at A24.
88 Cover, supra note 3, at 1615.
89 See Winter, supra note 81, at 1202-05 (arguing that game metaphors in the
political sphere may encourage passive spectatorship that harms democracy and other
civic values). For a parallel critique within the law school context, see DUNCAN
KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY 34 (1983)
(asserting that law schools model particular post-graduate professional hierarchies that
prevent students from assuming alternative professional and personal identities). But cf
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest
for Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L.REv. 993, 997 (1999) (arguing
"in favor of a new legal process jurisprudence, analogizing the legitimacy of such an
approach to the process theory that undergirds the legitimacy of contemporary athletics").
Whatever the take on ludic thinking in legal contexts, the creation of a ludic "schema"
will have lasting effects on legal practice and pedagogy. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon
Hanson, The Illusion ofLaw: The Legitimating Schemas ofModern Policy and Corporate
Law, 103 IIICH. L. REv. 1 (2004) (arguing that the legitimacy of institutions, outcomes,
policies, and laws come about through the illusive effects of schemas and scripts).
90 In Nineteen Eighty-Four, for example, the Party works tirelessly to distract the
proles with football and gambling and meaningless entertainment, "because only there, in
those swarming disregarded masses, 85 per cent of the population of Oceania, could the
force to destroy the Party ever be generated." ORWELL, supra note 12, at 72.
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sense ... . You don't demoralize and dehumanize a subject people by turning
them into celebrities and coaching them on how to craft an appealing persona
for a mass audience." 9 1 It is not the Tributes, however, who are the intended
subjects of the state's far-reaching oppression (they are, after all, already
trapped in the arena); rather, it is the viewing audience that concerns the
Capitol. If the Capitol can forge a relationship between the viewers and the
participants, if it can create a stake in the Games for the audience, the Capitol
will be able to transform the spectacle from a bloodbath into something with
more emotional resonance and catharsis, a theater of loss that ultimately
forecloses any actual dissatisfaction, social unrest, or political change.
Transforming the public into an audience also encourages complicity
with state objectives and actions. In The Running Man, a dystopian narrative
set in 2025, protagonist Ben Richards finds himself in need of money to buy
medicine for his baby daughter, and like many from the urban underclass
(then.and now), decides to audition for a spot reality television show. Reality
TV in 2025, however, has taken a decidedly violent turn:
For example, contestants on "Treadmill to Bucks" (only chronic heart, liver,
and lung patients participate) run until they have heart attacks. The activity
on "Swim the Crocodiles" needs no explanation; contestants blast each
other on "Run for Your Guns." Eventually, Richards lands a spot on "The
Running Man.". . ."The Running Man" features a nationwide televised and
armed manhunt for the contestant, who is staked to forty-eight hours' worth
of seed money and given a twelve-hour head start.92
Unlike the Hunger Games, there is no arena for this television show. Three
paid bounty hunters and local law enforcement pursue Richards through
actual towns and cities. If Richards can stay alive for a month, he will win an
enormous cash prize; additionally, his family receives money for each hour
that Richards stays alive and for each police officer who Richards kills.
Viewers of "The Running Man" also have the opportunity to win money for
providing any information that leads to the capture of whomever is currently
the Running Man; many eagerly participate in the hunt.
Both The Running Man and The Hunger Games situate the audience at
the center of the action, because it is the audience that needs manipulation by
the powers that be. Both novels convert the public into agentic and not
autonomous beings, following Cover and Milgram; the difference is that The
Running Man recasts the audience as an accomplice and rewards it for
91 Miller, supra note 1, at 135.
92 Texter, supra note 78, at 46.
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cooperation, while The Hunger Games relegates the audience to a powerless,
passive spectator role.93 Either way, just as Kafka's man was unable to
deviate from internalized norms around games and the liw, the mass of
people are controlled through the mechanism of game roles, formal rules, and
outside authority. The ludic metaphor keeps the audience behaving within the
confines of certain prescribed behavior, be. it active or passive, through the
invocation and recognition of ludic norms.
2. Change the Rules, Change the Game?
Is it possible for characters. in dystopian literature to escape these
psychological and physical constraints on freedom? Typically, the answer is
no. Dystopian works are fundamentally pessimistic and often end badly,
although sometimes so badly that the reader might suspect the author's overt
nihilism as strategic rhetoric in the service of social reform. Indeed, Foust
conceptualizes dystopian projects as pyramiding games into which the
dystopian author pulls the reader before exposing the game as a game, so that
the reader has new perspective on the capacity for social change and the
dangers of complacency. Foust asserts that in this way, dystopian game
structures provide toeholds for reconsidering sociopolitical realities.94
This is a qualified optimism, and in dystopian fiction for young adults,
such optimism may have more narrative presence and impact than in more
fatalistic adult-audience dystopian works. 95 At the midpoint of The Hunger
Games, for example, the Gamemakers -dramatically announce to the
contestants and to the audience that they have changed the rules to allow two
Tributes from the same District to team up and win together. Rule changes
are unheard of in 'Panem, and in the wake of the announcement, Katniss
realizes that the audience can-change the game:
93 According to Texter, King's novel:
Uses the techniques of war reporting and game shows in service of assuaging the
nation's fears about urban crime. The show allows middle-class viewers to forge an
identity, one presuming and actually creating a working-class, dangerous Other.
Simultaneously, the show destroys the symbols of poverty and crime in "this dark
and broken time."
Id. at 49.
94 See Foust, supra note 76, at 86.
95 See Miller, supra note 1, at 132-33.
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The star-crossed lovers . . . Peeta must have been playing that angle all
along. Why else would the Gamemakers have made this unprecedented
change in the rules? For two tributes to have a shot at winning, our
"romance" must be so popular with the audience that condemning it would
jeopardize the success of the Games. 96
Once Katniss and Peeta are the final Tributes standing, however, the
Gamemakers revoke the change without explanation. Faced with the prospect
of killing one another, Peeta valiantly offers to take the fall, but Katniss
realizes that the Gamemakers have made a strategic mistake:
[T]hey have to have a victor. Without a victor, the whole thing would blow
up in the Gamemakers' faces. They'd have failed the Capitol. Might
possibly even be executed, slowly and painfully while the cameras
broadcast it through every screen in the country.
If Peeta and I were both to die, or they thought we were ... .97
Without a winner, the spectators will have no cathartic release from the tragic
contest they have been watching, which may lead to dissatisfaction with the
Capitol's handling of the Games or, even worse, questions about the
institutional machinery and judgment that put such a system into place. This
is especially true for the District viewers, whose continued acquiescence to
participating in the Games relies, in large part, on the chance that one of their
Tributes will return home victorious. If the Games do not lead to a Victor,
then the Districts may refuse Capitol directives and resist Capitol predations.
When Katniss realizes the Capitol's predicament, she offers to split deadly
poison berries with Peeta. They stand back to back, counting down to three,
all of Panem glued to the set. The Gamemakers hastily reinstate the rule
change, and Katniss and Peeta become the first double Victors in Panem
history.98
The inability of the Capitol to dictate arbitrary rule changes is telling,
because it speaks to the double-edged nature of games as instruments of state
power. Even the totalitarian state cannot fool around with the rules too much
96 COLLINS, supra note 82, at 247.
97 Id. at 344.
98 Richards is not so lucky. After killing the bounty hunters and refusing an offer to
become the Chief Hunter on future episodes of "The Running Man," Richards flies an
airplane into the Games Commission Building, killing himself and everyone associated
with the show's production. See KING, supra note 84, at 691-92. This ending is actually a
little more upbeat than most classic dystopian endings, which typically feature the utter
subjugation and defeat of the protagonist.
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without angering the very subjects it attempts to oppress. 99 Importantly, this
anger is not directed toward state cruelty or excess but instead comes from
the spectator's strong interest in maintaining the internal consistency of a
self-executing, definitionally finite, rule-bound system. Rule changes that
appear inconsistent, contrary, or arbitrary, however, create widespread
dissatisfaction that, in dystopian fiction at least, is counterproductive to the
state's oppressive objectives.
For lawyers, this psycho-structural aspect of games suggests broad and
appealing analogies with legal philosophy and the possibility of institutional
reform. That Katniss could "win" the game by using the rules of the game
("there must be a winner") against the state recalls the enduring cultural
paradigm of the reformist lawyer who changes the legal system from within,
without revolution, and to extents not dreamed possible before the reforms
occurred.100 Relatedly, the popular appeal of "originalism" may come, at
least in part, from psychological tendencies favoring the apparent fairness of
rules that remain the same over time.101 The Bill of Middlesex and other
common law legal fictions are evidence of a system rooted in the belief that
any change must happen within the context of the rules themselves, as a
function of common law judging or legislative product or executive order,
lest the public institutional credibility of the law evaporate.102 The principle
of "equal justice under law" presumes, as Leff noted, an almost visceral
belief that just outcomes flow from rules, not the other way around.
99 See Law And, supra note 28, at 1000-01.
100 Take, for example, the life and legal victories procured by Justice Thurgood
Marshall, the U.S. Supreme Court's first African-American Justice. Prior to assuming his
station on the Supreme Court, Marshall was best known as "an architect of much of the
nation's civil rights history," culminating in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Neil A. Lewis, A Slave's Great-Grandson Who Used Law To Lead the Rights Revolution,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/28/us/a-slave-
s-great-grandson-who-used-law-to-lead-the-rights-
revolution.html?pagewanted=all&src-pm.
101 Studies show that procedural fairness greatly influences perspectives on overall
fairness. Kees van den Bos et al., The Psychology ofProcedural and Distributive Justice
Viewed from the Perspective of Fairness Heuristic Theory, in JUSTICE IN THE
WORKPLACE 49 (2001) (discussing heuristic theory of fairness and recent studies on
procedural and distributive fairness standards).
102 The Bill of Middlesex allowed the King's Bench to have jurisdiction where it
otherwise would not by claiming that the defendant committed trespass in the county of
Middlesex. Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truths, ST. THOMAS L. REv. 1, 9
(2010); see also LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967).
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Still, dystopian stories generally do not admit the possibility of positive
change, and certainly do not valorize incremental changes within the system.
Katniss's clever play against the Capitol backfires, as she and her family
become targets of the state. Attempting to steer social development and legal
culture through game-embedded rule changes implicates too many unknown
variables and too much susceptibility to ideological capture ever to work as
cleanly as planned. Moreover, the idea that one effectuates social change by
preserving the underlying game but changing the top-level rules seems to
suffer from a failure of imagination. 0 3 What if-as many dystopian authors
and ADR theorists have pointed out, in one form or another-the game itself
is the problem?
C. Questions that Dystopian Games Pose for ADR
At first, the idea of pairing Leff's ludic metaphor with Collins's The
Hunger Games may sound like one of those surrealist party games in which
players are supposed to make meaning out of randomly matched sentences.
Leff and Collins are not writing for the same audiences, certainly, and they
are not part of the same intellectual communities or historical moments.
Moreover, The Hunger Games is not obviously about the legal system (as is,
for example, Kafka's The Trial) but instead spins a made-for-the-movies
fable about teen angst and oppression. Even broadening the comparison
beyond The Hunger Games to encompass dystopian literature and theory
generally does not make the connection to Leff more immediately apparent.
The exaggerated pessimism of dystopian themes and storylines seems, at
least at first, incommensurate with Leff's simple tale of the Jondo, the Usa,
and the tribe of scholars.
Yet the pairing has useful analytical synergy. Common to both legal
games and dystopianism is the recognition that people long for determinacy
and closure. What Leff would call "desire for determinacy" shows up in
dystopian stories as "desire for utopia," the complex of sociopolitical and
psychoanalytical fantasies around individual wholeness and societal
coherence within an environment free of trauma, disruption, and
uncertainty.104 Utopian yearnings and fantasies are a primary subject of
103 See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal
Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REv. 937 (2007) (discussing
the simultaneous role of law as both the exclusive authority in society and the only
engine for social change).
104 The seductive appeal of utopia-a society "in which life is uncomplicated, more
equitable, and where an ideal moral, social, and political climate is to be found" has long
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critique in dystopian literature because they can empower would-be tyrants
with inordinate psychic control over members of society. As Professor
Morson writes:
Many modem anti-utopias, especially. dystopias, are concerned not only
with the untenability of claims to certainty, but also with the strength of the
epistemological yearning that leads to such claims. The imaginary societies
they describe are frequently based on the satisfaction of that yearning....
Believing that people cannot be happy so long as they doubt, the founders
and rulers of some modem dystopias (e.g., We and Brave New World)
knowingly preside over the falsehood that there are no more unanswered
questions. 105
To the extent that legal structures are also trying to promote coherence
and determinacy, then, they become possible subjects within the narrative
domain of dystopian fiction. Leff did not overtly recognize this possibility,
but merely pointed out that the desire for determinacy led to ludism in
political and legal institutions, because the rule-boundedness of games permit
the formal equality of roles and the conclusive outcomes that appear to track
with notions of justice. Dystopian theorists recognize this human need but
take the additional step of pointing to the danger posed by would-be
oppressors who may exploit this pervasive psychic need.
At the intersection of legal games and dystopian theory, then, are two
competing impulses: the desire for and the distrust of utopian ambitions in
the law. Games or structures emerge as a way to institutionalize these
ambitions, but in turn are susceptible to becoming tools of oppression. Yet
resonated in the West, even before Sir Thomas More published his famous essay in 1516.
E.D.S. Sullivan, Place in No Place: Examples of the Ordered Society in Literature, in
THE UTOPIAN VISION 29 (E.D.S. Sullivan ed., 1983). Dystopian or anti-utopian literature
is a response to utopian hegemony over thought and behavior, demonstrating how "the
controlled society-no matter how benevolent originally-can be twisted and
manipulated for thoroughly irrational and, ultimately, completely unhappy ends." Id. at
42. Professor Morson explains that "'dystopia' [is] a type of anti-utopia that discredits
utopias by portraying the likely effects of their realization," and so is properly understood
as a reaction to utopian visions of social ordering and control, even though those visions
are supposed to lead to happiness. GARY SAUL MORSON, THE BOUNDARIES OF GENRE
115-16 (1981). Additionally, dystopian works may play out imagined ramifications of
present-day political and social arrangements gone wrong. "Indeed, dystopian fictions are
typically set in places or times far distant from the author's own, but it is usually clear
that the real referents of dystopian fictions are generally quite concrete and near-at-hand."
BOOKER, supra note 59, at 19.
105 MORSON, supra note 104, at 125-26.
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even after games become evidently oppressive, the internalized norms and
values around games legitimize the oppression. This push-pull forms the
backdrop for examining the proliferation of alternative or appropriate dispute
resolution (ADR) processes. The skeptical Leff did not envision an
alternative process that would be superior to the Trial, and would likely have
rejected the notion that one game is "better" than another. How, then, would
ADR fit into Leffs model of the Usa's dispute resolution landscape? If ADR
is a game, if only because of the definitional elasticity of the word "game,"
then is it just another game that we are destined to lose? Or are ADR games
just an outgrowth of legal ludism, providing an existential palliative creating
the pleasant illusion of control? If so, are there social costs externalized
through the proliferation of ADR processes that are not taken into account?
Dystopianism does not answer these questions, but instead provides a more
aggressive investigatory stance from which to evaluate them.
IV. GAMES, DYSTOPIA, AND ADR
Consider the following passages:
Most experts agree that courts are ill-equipped to handle interdisciplinary
issues present in divorce cases. Courts can address legal issues that arise
when a marriage is terminated, but are unable to also ameliorate the
psychological and emotional fallout. Litigant-specific results that fit
particular family situations are often unavailable because statutory
restrictions on judicial authority are imposed. Judicial labor is reduced when
orders fall within parameters adopted by the legislature that make specific
fact-finding unnecessary. It is more expedient for judges to follow
guidelines that provide a one-size-fits-all solution rather than tailor orders to
meet individual family needs. Consequently, easing the trauma suffered by
a family falls outside judicial purview. 106
We live longer and better than any other citizens in the history of the world.
And it's thanks in large part to the Matching System, which produces
physically and emotionally healthy offspring . . .. The goal of Matching is
twofold: to provide the healthiest possible future citizens for our Society
and to provide the best chances for interested citizens to experience
successful Family Life. It is of the utmost importance to the Society that the
106 Elena B. Langan, "We Can Work It Out": Using Cooperative Mediation - A
Blend of Collaborative Law and Traditional Mediation - To Resolve Divorce Disputes,
30 REv. LITIG. 245, 246-47 (2011).
517
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Matches be as optimal as possible. 107
Both excerpts start from the same premise: that existing state mechanisms for
promoting healthy family life are inadequate because they do not provide for
the unique challenges that can emerge in marriage, childrearing, and other
family-specific situations. Both excerpts make similar promises: creative
sociopolitical and legal reforms are necessary to improve the overall welfare
of individuals in families. Moreover, as a stylistic matter, both excerpts have
an analytical, technocratic affect that gives the impression that whatever
problems exist, they are understandable and solvable. Of course, the actual
contexts and policy prescriptions of both pieces are quite different. The first
is a scholarly article recommending cooperative mediation ("a blend of
collaborative law and traditional mediation") in divorce cases; the second is a
fictional account of a futuristic society that has foreclosed marital discord
and familial strife through sophisticated "matching" technology that assigns
spouses within a restrictive legal framework that apparently does not permit
divorce. Even so, the progressive dynamic that underlies both pieces-the
certainty that the conventional way of doing things is broken, the optimism
that a superior approach is available, and the confidence in assembling
existing and new system components into an innovative technological
solution-is the same.
For the ADR theorist, this sameness is instructive. As noted in the
previous section, a central subject of most dystopian literature is the
exploitative potential of the utopian state. Utopias, in seeking to promote
happy harmonious existence, often limit available choices to "good" ones in
developing sociopolitical frameworks that ensure peaceful lives for every
member of society. Dystopian literature reveals these imagined societies as
dangerous traps for individuals whose desire for determinacy, commonly
paired with an aversion to conflict and an overreliance on notions of progress
and technology, make them susceptible to subjugation. Underneath the
apparent "utopian" contentedness of dystopian society rumbles the heavy
machinery of state and/or corporate interests, which maintain the illusion of
happiness and harmony through the systematic and often violent elimination
of conflict, choice, and consent. As Orwell describes:
It was terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you were in any
public place or within range of a telescreen. The smallest thing could give
you away. A nervous tic, an unconscious look of anxiety, a habit of
107 ALLY CONDIE, MATCHED 19, 44 (2010).
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muttering to yourself---anything that carried with it the suggestion of
abnormality, of having something to hide. In any case, to wear an improper
expression on your face (to look incredulous when a victory was
announced, for example) was itself a punishable offense. There was even a
word for it in Newspeak: facecrime, it was called.108
What Orwell and other dystopian authors suggest is that the inability to
predict and/or resist tyrannical predations is a product not only of external
power structures but also of our strong psychosocial longings for
determinacy, wholeness, and peace-to appear and to be peaceful and calm,
suffused with "quiet optimism" and completely self-actualized.109 Utopian
visions speak to these desires and so make possible these dangers.
To the extent that alternative processes are a utopian response to
perceived inadequacies in existing legal and alternative frameworks, then,
they become interesting candidates for dystopian analysis. Up to this point,
the focus has been on the dystopian resonance of legal games. Now, the
analysis naturally turns to ADR, as offering perhaps utopian alternatives to
legal games that seek to avoid the dystopian tendencies of the law. This
analysis seeks not only to critique but also to appreciate utopianism in ADR,
and attempts to recognize the dystopian downsides of utopian ADR thinking
along with the transformative benefits that ADR practitioners and
participants may at times actually recognize.
The part starts with ADR utopianism. Closer examination of the ever-
growing list of ADR processes and contexts indicates that there is not a
single utopian vision animating alternative practice; rather, there are multiple
and sometimes conflicting utopian ideals in play, and understanding how this
epistemological economy works (and does not work) in ADR is important in
the dystopian analysis. The part then returns to the original metaphor of the
hunger games, at last reaching the question of how ADR games can turn into
ADR hunger games-that is, how innovative alternative processes can end
up replicating the very problems that they were designed to avoid. Finally,
this part considers implications for scholars and practitioners.
108 ORWELL, supra note 12, at 65.
109 Id. at 6 ("Winston turned round abruptly. He had set his features into the
expression of quiet optimism which it was advisable to wear when facing the
telescreen.").
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A. Modern ADR Utopianism
Early utopian thinkers "regarded litigation, quarrels and disputes as a
symptom of imperfect human relationships; their aim was to eliminate
them.""l0 These traditional utopianists were ambitious and optimistic,
promulgating a wide variety of possible solutions to social problems. Even
amid this process disparity, however, "their goals display[ed] a remarkable
affinity: the advancement of knowledge, the control of nature, the relief of
poverty, the elimination of disputes and the atainment [sic] of universal
peace and harmony."I"'
For many ADR proponents, this ambitious can-do attitude and affiliated
goals still resonate. The "alternative" in ADR is commonly understood to
mean "alternative to conventional litigation," and may include such diverse
procedures"l 2 as arbitration, mediation, negotiation, litigotiation,'l3 mini-
trials and early neutral evaluation,114. rent-a-judge,115  reg-neg," 6
110 Keith Thomas, The Utopian Impulse in Seventeenth-Century England, in
BETWEEN DREAM AND NATURE: ESSAYS ON UTOPIA AND DYSTOPIA 20, 38 (Dominic
Baker-Smith & C.C. Barfoot eds., 1987).
Ill Id at41.
112 Stephen Goldberg, Eric Green, and Frank Sander compiled and delineated these
categories in the first major ADR casebook, Dispute Resolution. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG
ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7-10 (1985).
113 Litigotiation is the "strategic pursuit of a settlement through mobilizing the court
process." Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach about Legal
Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984).
114 Mini-trials and early neutral evaluation are examples of "so-called mixed
processes, which combine elements of more than one basic dispute resolution process
[that is, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration]." LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS ABRIDGED EDITION 14 (3d ed. 2006). In both the mini-trial
and early neutral evaluation, a knowledgeable neutral advises the parties on how a "real"
trial might turn out, should the parties decide to litigate. Id. at 14-15.
115 Rent-a-judges are state-sanctioned (usually by statute) and privately hired
arbitrators or judges. For more information on the background and history of the practice,
see Anne S. Kim, Rent-a-Judges and the Cost of Selling Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 166, 168
(1994); Robert Gnaizda, Secret Justice for the Privileged Few, 66 JUDICATURE 6, 11
(1982) (arguing against the practice as exclusionary); Robert Coulson, Private Settlement
for the Public Good, 66 JUDICATURE 7, 8 (1982) (promoting rent-a-judges as a "special,
statutory form of arbitration").
116 "Reg-neg" describes regulatory negotiation sessions in which interested parties
negotiate regulations with an agency or rule-making body. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald,
ADR and the Courts: An Update, 46 DUKE L.J. 1445, 1457-58 (1997).
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collaborative law, 117 dispute systems design, 18 case management,"l 9
multiparty consensus building,120 online dispute resolution,121 ombuds,122
117 Collaborative law practice seeks to capitalize on the benefits of legal
representatives without the encumbrances of legal strategizing and gameplay. In a
collaborative law scenario, the parties agree to limit the scope of legal representation to
creative problem solving and mutually agreeable negotiated outcomes. Should one or
both of the parties decide to pursue litigation, both attorneys (pursuant to the initial
agreement) are disqualified and the parties must engage new counsel. PAULINE H.
TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE
WITHOUT LITIGATION 9 (2d. ed. 2008). Concerns that collaborative practice may conflict
with the lawyer's ethical duties have proven mostly speculative at this point. See Ted
Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in
Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 311-24 (2008). Should collaborative law
become a more prominent process choice outside of the marriage dissolution context,
however, it may begin to receive more critical scrutiny.
118 See generally CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES-MERCHANT,
DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (1996); WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETTING
DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS To CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988).
119 Case management describes the role of judges before and during trial; in addition
to their traditional adjudicatory role, judges are also actively involved in promoting
settlement and clearing dockets. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); see also Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management:
Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669 (2010) (exploring the criticisms and benefits
of modem pretrial case management).
120 See generally LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE To REACHING AGREEMENT (1999); but see also
Lawrence Susskind, Consensus Building and ADR: Why They Are Not the Same Thing, in
THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 358, 367-69 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C.
Bordone, eds., 2005) (differentiating between multiparty consensus-building and court-
connected alternative processes).
121 Online dispute resolution refers both to the use of internet and similar
technologies to assist in dispute processing and to the resolution of disputes that happen
online, such as buyer-seller disputes on eBay. See, e.g., COLIN RULE, ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION FOR BUSINESS: B2B, E-COMMERCE, CONSUMER, EMPLOYMENT, INSURANCE,
AND OTHER COMMERCIAL CONFLICTS (2002). The field is in its early, and somewhat
intriguing, stages. See, e.g., David Allen Larson, Artificial Intelligence: Robots, Avatars,
and the Demise of the Human Mediator, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 105, 163 (2010)
("There is a generation quickly moving to adulthood that spends significant time
interacting with avatars in cyberspace.. . They will search for, and will not hesitate to
use, artificial intelligence devices to assist them in dispute resolution and problem
solving. They are able to interact with avatars, robots, and other forms of relational
agents easily and will expect and demand dispute resolvers and problem solvers to be
similarly prepared.").
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and cooperative process.123 These processes (or "games") can vary widely, in
terms of parties, processes, purposes, contexts, and typical outcomes.
Adhesive arbitration between a credit card company and a customer is
different from a mediation between neighbors at a community mediation
services office. Negotiating one's promotion package is different from
building a dispute resolution process to handle sexual harassment grievances
at a university. Even processes that sound like the same thing can be different
depending on the context and participants: as Laura Nader and others have
pointed out, private mediation in an American city between white
businessmen may not resemble-as a matter of process, of substantive
results, or of broader sociopolitical import-private mediation imported into
African communities that replaces local forms of dispute resolution and
displaces formal adjudicatory processes. 124
Cutting across these different forms are various renditions of traditional
ADR chapter and verse that reenvision traditional utopian ideals within a
more economically aware context: to provide straightforward, sensible
procedures that lead to mutually beneficial outcomes, whether in the context
of dispute resolution or dealmaking.125 Generally speaking, regardless of the
type of ADR, and regardless of the political motivation underlying the
process, this dual emphasis on procedural clarity and substantive welfare
122 An ombudsman is typically an organizational representative who addresses
complaints from a particular group, such as employees or consumers, and provides
constructive feedback to the organization. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Ombuds: A Voice for
the People, 11 No. 2 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 5 (2005) (giving a general overview of the
history, types, and roles of ombuds).
123 Cooperative process or cooperative negotiation is similar to collaborative law but
without the disqualification agreement. Parties agree "to negotiate in good faith, provide
relevant documentation, and use joint experts as appropriate." John Lande, A Recent
Innovation, 'Cooperative' Negotiation Can Promote Early and Efficient Settlement
Through Joint Case Management, 27 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 117, 117
(2009); see also John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss:
Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce
Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 280, 284 (2004).
124 See Laura Nader & Elisabetta Grande, Current Illusions and Delusions about
Conflict Management - In Africa and Elsewhere, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 573, 587
(2002).
125 In addition to dispute resolution and dealmaking, there are also negotiated
arrangements having to do with group dynamics, working relationships, and other
organizational or relational concerns. DANNY ERTEL & MARK GORDON, THE POINT OF
THE DEAL: How To NEGOTIATE WHEN YES IS NOT ENOUGH, 14-15 (2007).
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persists,126 usually with respect to imagined alternatives, typically litigation.
One of the similarities between consumer arbitration, organizational dispute
systems, and neighbor-to-neighbor mediation, for example, is that they are all
happening in the "shadow of the law," an evocative phrase that suggests both
the hulking monolithic presence of legal institutions nearby as well as the
private, hidden nature of many alternative processes.127 The law's shadow
not only determines the bargaining entitlements that participants have (thus
providing a benchmark for determining the value of particular proposals),128
it also heightens the contrast between the alternative and primary processes,
which may bolster and sustain participation.
Additionally, many modern alternative processes have their intellectual
provenance in the canon of interest-based or "principled" negotiation as
described by Roger Fisher and William Ury in Getting to Yes.129 Fisher and
Ury's familiar four tenets include focusing on interests instead of positions,
separating the people from the problem, using objective criteria, and
generating options for mutual gain.130 Proponents of interest-based processes
assert that such processes add value by allowing for the possibility of
integrative solutions to apparently zero-sum situations.131 By sharing
information, such as the parties' interests or available resources, participants
attempt to build Pareto-optimal packages through value-creating trades that
leave both parties better off than they would have been without negotiating,
or only negotiating on a single distributive issue. Interest-based process
advocates also stress the importance of finding value through differences-
including differences in time horizons, risk preferences, valuations and
priorities, and resources-that facilitate trading for mutual gain and enhance
the value of final agreements. 132 Even ADR processes and scholarship that
do not mention Getting to Yes or its progeny almost always assume one or
126 Here, the term "welfare" does not have a redistributive connotation but instead
refers to social utility in the aggregate. So an ADR process may lead to greater social
utility even though it disproportionately benefits one party over another.
127 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979).
128 Id. at 968.
129 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHoUT GIVING IN 10-11 (1981) (hereinafter GETTING TO YES).
130 Id. at 73.
131 See id.; see also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING 11-43 (2000);
WILLIAM URY, GETING PASTNO 159-171 (1991).
132 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 131, at 14-15.
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more of these ideas in whatever theoretical foundation they end up
developing.133
The idea of developing innovative cures to social problems and creating
a private, harmonious space peopled with autonomous beings recalls More's
Utopia, a "distant island" far removed from the corruption and injustice of
political society, an alternative approach, the world "as it should be."' 34 ADR
culture internalizes similar aspirations and develops processes meant to
correct for the shortcomings of existing processes while promoting holistic
visions of community and individual justice.135
The wide range of available processes and their underlying aspirational
justifications are suggestive of the modern utopian sensibilities in ADR.
Austin Sarat observed that the exercise of defining processes ("essentialism")
and matching them to disputes revives elements of nineteenth-century legal
formalism in ways that are "not politically neutral."1 36 Matching disputes to
formats is arguably a strongly game-like activity; indeed, the idea of ADR as
a sort of matching game maps well onto Sarat's observations about the
neoformalism of the field. In a 1988 review of the first definitive dispute
resolution casebook (Goldberg, Green, and Sander's Dispute Resolution),
Sarat pointed out some foundational assumptions in alternative practice that
echo traditional utopian values and persist today:
The new formalism . .. also contains the ideal of effective resolution, which
holds that given the right match of dispute and dispute processing
technique, harmony can be restored and problems can have resolutions that
satisfy the disputants and are therefore likely to be final . . .. This emphasis
on resolution suggests a preference for an image of social life in which
harmony prevails; conflicts are idiosyncratic; and mediation, arbitration,
adjudication and other dispute processing techniques work to resolve
problems.137
133 As Bob Bordone has drolly observed, many "new" advances in ADR often seem
like nothing more than Getting to Yes "put in a blender, mixed up for a bit, and then
poured back out." E-mail from Robert C. Bordone, Thaddeus R. Beal Clinical Professor
of Law, Harvard Law School, to Jennifer Reynolds, Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Oregon School of Law (June 30, 2011) (on file with author).
134 GOTLIEB, supra note 2, at 26.
135 See, e.g., BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 53, at 259 (describing the possibility of a
"different, relational society" as a kind of realizable utopia).
136 Austin Sarat, The "New Formalism" in Disputing and Dispute Processing, 21
LAW & SOC'Y REv. 695, 697, 705 (1988).
137 Id. at 698.
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Sarat notes that "[t]he escape to the private realm of agreement, to a restored
and harmonious consensus, is to be preferred to the public realm with its
compulsions, divisions, zero-sum decisions, and shattering social effects." 38
Although he did not mean this as a compliment (he goes on to explain how
these priorities may curtail or limit, greater sociological understanding around
dispute processing), this, description nonetheless sounds very much like the
sorts of justifications commonly offered by ADR specialists for alternative
processes.
Of course, ADR scholars and practitioners are aware of the aspirational
and sometimes utopian overtones of much ADR literature. 139 Moreover,
most ADR specialists realize that utopian goals are not as dreamily coherent
as they sound. The utopian impulse may be widespread without necessarily
giving rise to identical utopian prescriptions.140 As Donna Shestowsky has
pointed out in the early case management context, two traditional ADR
"utopias"-self-determination and institutional efficiency-often work at
cross purposes, making provision of justice difficult.141 Likewise, in adhesive
arbitration scenarios, the utopian ADR goals of autonomy and institutional
efficiency are in conflict and cannot work together without, perversely, the
legal fiction of consent provided by contract law.142 These tensions
notwithstanding, utopian predilections continue to inform conventional ADR
138 Id at 705.
139 Michael Moffitt's term "ADR evangelists" aptly describes both the subgroup of
ADR scholars and practitioners who are "true believers" as well as the widespread
presumption within ADR communities favoring alternative processes. See Michael L.
Moffitt, Three Things To Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
1203, 1204 (2009).
140 "A utopia to one reader can be a totalitarian hell to another and quite a boring
place to a third.. . It can consequently exist only at an individual level, but then an
individual utopia is, strictly speaking, no utopia at all since the concept is ultimately
founded on the idea of complete consensus." PIA MARIA AHLBACK, ENERGY
HETEROTOPIA DYSTOPIA: GEORGE ORWELL, MICHEL FOUCAULT AND THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY ENVIRONMENTAL IMAGINATION 161 (2001).
141 Donna Shestowsky, Disputants' Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute
Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 549, 551 (2008).
142 See, e.g., Clark Freshman, Tweaking the Market for Autonomy: A Problem-
Solving Perspective to Informed Consent in Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 909, 910
(2002) (thinking through incentives and barriers to offering greater actual autonomy in
arbitration contexts).
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responses to the drawbacks of traditional litigation and to the promise of
process innovations.
B. ADR Hunger Games
As an example of utopianism in ADR scholarship, consider this
introduction from a recent piece on early case management (early case
management is a set of innovative ADR processes designed to facilitate
upstream resolution of court cases more efficiently):
Thomas Hobbes famously described human life as "nasty, brutish, and
short." No doubt, many litigants would give the same description of
litigation, except they see it as "nasty, brutish, and long." . . . Being in a
dispute in an adversarial disputing culture is enough to bring out the brute in
many people. Even though many parties and lawyers are not generally
nasty, they may act that way in response to their perception of nastiness by
the other side. This can lead to a cycle of escalating conflict, which
prolongs the agony. The last thing that some people want to do in this
situation is to work cooperatively with (what they perceive as) the brute on
the other side. 143
It is useful to note that in Hobbes's view, what makes life nasty, brutish, and
short is not the "Leviathan" of formal structured government; on the
contrary, the Leviathan prevents society from devolving into the ultimate
dystopia: constant violence and war.144 Governments, and by extension legal
institutions, are therefore necessary evils that individuals jointly accept in
order to create and preserve minimum standards of existence. By calling on
143 John Lande, The Movement Toward Early Case Handling in Courts and Private
Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 81, 81-82 (2008).
144 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 227 (Penguin Books 1985) (1651) ("This is more
than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person,
made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should
say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man,
or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and
Authorise all his Actions in like manner ... This is the Generation of that great
LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee
owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence."). Interestingly, Leff also
sometimes referred to the legal system as a Leviathan. See Arthur Allen Leff, Injury,
Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1970)
(comparing the "judicial-coercive process" to a costly Leviathan that moves "to its own
arcane principles").
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this tradition of political philosophy, the author recasts the conventional legal
system in the undesirable "state of nature" role-a role that, in fact, is even
worse than Hobbes's state of nature, which at least was mercifully short.
Suggesting that the modem legal system transforms people into mindless
brutes' 45 has strong cultural significance, because it implies that the social
contract, which was supposed to prevent people from becoming brutes, has
failed.
As an alternative, the author states that early case management offers
substantive and procedural improvements over litigation that (although no
"silver bullet") promise "in theory . . . few or no disadvantages" 14 6 and
provide larger individual and social benefits of "increased cooperation
between lawyers and parties, increased and strategic focus on the most
critical issues in the conflict, reduction in unproductive conflict, and
improvement of relationships."1 47 These suggested benefits resonate with the
model of the social contract and provide a modest demonstration of the
utopian/dystopian dynamic at work in ADR scholarship: the juxtaposition of
the irreparably failed/failing current process with the normatively superior,
substantially more beneficial proposed process.
Of course, framing an argument in dystopian and utopian valences is a
familiar rhetorical move, in ADR and other types of legal scholarship. What
might be less familiar is how this kind of utopian/dystopian interpretive
stance fuels much of the intellectual and practical innovation in ADR culture,
not just as an attention-getter but as a substantive justification for major
changes to or departures from public institutions. Indeed, one hallmark of
ADR-driven reforms (either of traditional legal processes or of existing
alternative processes) is the explicit and often exaggerated dualism between
innovative and existing processes as good/bad or utopian/dystopian. This
dualism is often atmospheric, more of an undercurrent than a supporting
pillar of the argument.
Put another way, ADR specialists often evoke the specter of dystopian
society-the hunger games, in various permutations-to validate utopian
overhauls of the legal system. 148 In the Hobbes excerpt above, a dystopian
145 See Lande, supra note 143, at 84 (differentiating between people who
"intentionally exercise responsibility" [using early case management] from those who
"passively allow[] the case to run its course" [in litigation]).
146 Id. at 86, 87 (emphasis added).
147 Id. at 93.
148 Comparing ADR utopia with legal dystopia is common and problematic. "As
many critics of ADR note, proponents of ADR often engage in false comparisons: an
ideal of ADR versus an imperfect reality of litigation." Freshman, supra note 140, at 943
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vision of litigation warranted significant procedural changes in how civil
cases proceed in the early stages. The assertion prompts the question: has
early case management actually mitigated the dystopian effects of traditional
litigation? One prominent restorative justice scholar, referring to early case
management as itself an "ADR dystopia," clearly does not think so:
[C]ivil law ADR [which includes early case management] . . . is likely to
fail when it is under the hegemony of lawyering for three reasons. First, the
lawyer's reform instinct is to narrow the issues-a turn in the wrong
direction. Second, the lawyer's practice instinct is to scheme to corrupt the
narrowing so it conceals from the light of truth any bad aspects of her
client's case. Third, lawyer domination of ADR means that ADR is used
tactically and cynically to extract as much truth as possible from any
noncynical truthful engagement by the other side while communicating
deceptively to them in an attempt to put them on the wrong scent. Nontruth
and nonreconciliation are the most likely results when the culture of
adversarial lawyering captures both the convening of ADR and the
presentation by both sides of the facts to be mediated. 149
According to this scholar, the integration of alternative processes within
traditional litigation frameworks cannot work because the participants-
namely, lawyers-are only able to play one kind of game. The article goes on
to argue that ADR processes:
should not be convened by lawyers, should not normally hear from lawyers,
should reject legal discourse of a sort that narrows the issues to the legally
relevant, should resist domination by courts that instruct it to do so, and
should attempt to outflank such legal domination by a preference for
bottom-up face-to-face dialogue among a plurality of stakeholders before
any lawyers start collecting fees. 150
(citing Robert A. Baruch Bush, 'What Do We Need a Mediator For?:' Mediation's
Value-Added for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 6 (1996)); see also
Richard L. Abel, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 9 (Richard L. Abel
ed., 1982).
149 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 249
(2002).
150 Id. at 250. Braithwaite does mention, however, that lawyers trained in
collaborative law might be all right; see id. (stating that collaborative law paradigms
"might give pause to my earlier reservations about lawyers speaking during restorative
justice processes").
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The author's dystopian vision of early case management and similar efforts is
marked by the fundamental disconnect between the normative aspirations of
ADR and the actual priorities and practices of lawyers involved in such "top-
down" alternatives. On this view, early case management and other forms of
"legal ADR" are "dystopia[n]" and even "pathological"1 51 in that both
subvert the philosophy and intentions of alternative processes by mapping
alternative processes onto adversarial lawyering, a sort of subroutine of the
primary game of the Trial.
Here, then, we have our first example of an ADR hunger game: an
innovation-here, early case management, which promises to restore human
dignity to dispute resolution processes that have become brutish and
inhumane-that, ultimately, does not just fall short of the mark but actually
harms participants by exposing them to litigation-level risks without giving
them the protections afforded by the civil system and, as a result, retards the
progress of social justice. Early case management, itself sold as a utopian
upgrade of traditional litigation, creates-in Braithwaite's view-the worst
of all worlds, a dystopia of sharp lawyers running roughshod over helpless
disputants.
Characterizing early case management in such a dystopian manner
recalls other similar critiques of ADR in other contexts, notably feminist and
race-based analyses of power differentials in mediation and other alternative
processes. 152 In these critiques, as in the above critique of early case
management, ADR's utopian ideals of consent, autonomy, self-
151 Id. at 248, 253. Note that the language of pathology and cure echoes the
reformist ambitions (i.e., "we can fix this") of the early utopians.
152 See, e.g., Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on
Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV.
L.J. 399 (2004-05); Susan Silbey, The Emperor's New Clothes: Mediation Mythology
and Markets, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 171, 174 (2002) ("Mediation is ideological because it
masks its institutionalized exercises of power within claims about justice"); Eric
Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have All the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1055
(1996); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement To Reform Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
1 (1993); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of
Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992); Trina Grillo; The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (claiming that mandatory mediation
"often imposes a rigid orthodoxy as to how they should speak, make decisions, and be.
This orthodoxy is imposed through subtle and not-so-subtle messages about appropriate
conduct and about what may be said in mediation. It is an orthodoxy that often excludes
the possibility of the parties' speaking with their authentic voices"); Richard Delgado et
al., supra note 10; Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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determination, and peace become coercive state instruments that vaunt
efficiency over self-determination and peace over justice, even though (as in
the case of court-connected early processes) the efficiency benefits are
routinely overstated. 153
One might argue, however, that this particular hunger game is not a good
example. Early case management, after all, is a close cousin of civil
litigation, which arguably may have contaminated an otherwise well-
intentioned process. Braithwaite, who criticized early case management as
dystopian, is a proponent of restorative justice; let us turn our attention
there.154 In Braithwaite's view, restorative justice, unlike the process
tweaking of early case management, claims to offer "a restorative and
responsive transformation of the entire legal system." 55 By cultivating
shared values throughout society (among them fairness, justice,
nondomination, deliberation, and public accountability)156 and by "caus[ing]
the organizational sector of the economy to internalize most of the current
public costs of civil disputing,"' 57 an innovative restorative justice approach
that is simultaneously grassroots and subsidized by private institutions may
answer the needs of individual and social justice:
[A] rule of law that grows from the impulses bubbled up from the
restorative justice of the people, a legal system where the justice of the law
has a conduit for filtering down to the justice of the people and vice versa,
will be a more democratic rule of law than one shaped by legal
entrepreneurs who work only in the service of the rich and powerful . .. . It
is not that the "balance" between restorative justice and state justice has
been got right, it is that the one is constantly enriching and checking the
other.158
153 See Shestowsky, supra note 139, at 551 ("Courts often subordinate disputants'
needs to the desires of the bench (as well as the bar) to clear dockets and reduce the
institutional costs of disputes even though empirical studies of court-connected programs
suggest that they often fail to meet these institutional goals.").
154 Restorative justice is "a movement in criminal law in which criminal justice and
criminal sentencing are carried out by the community, the victim, and the offender in a
collaborative process." RISKIN ET AL., supra note 114, at 537.
155 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 149, at 264.
156 Id. at 264.
157 Id. at 265. Here, Braithwaite is advancing Christine Parker's ideas about
organizational involvement in dispute prevention and resolution. See id. at 254-57.
158 Id. at 265.
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This theoretical structure (which he claims is "not as utopian as it seems")
aims to "transform the place of regulation and law in sustaining the economy,
managing relationships between nations, reinventing education and building
a richer democracy." 59
Whatever one thinks about the substantive merits of these proposed
restorative justice reforms (or of early case management, for that matter), it is
undeniable that his proposal sounds utopian, for at least two reasons: one, the
valorization of uniformly shared social values that presupposes a common
understanding of things like "fairness" and "justice"; and two, the optimistic
assertion that an organization's "internalization of the costs of disputing" not
only will expand access to justice for the disadvantaged but will foster more
"dispute prevention rather than dispute resolution."1 60 As before, the
utopian/dystopian dynamic is in play. The earlier piece starts with the
dystopian ("brutish") nature of traditional litigation and proposes, in
response, early case management. The following piece starts with the
dystopian ("dystopian" and "pathological") nature of early case management
and proposes, in response, ambitious restorative justice reforms. In both
cases, the scholars are careful not to claim that their proposals will lead to
"utopian" results but nevertheless incorporate utopian subtexts into their
scholarship, promising significant substantive, socially transformative, and
individually beneficial results.
For all the utopian rhetoric of restorative justice, it does not take much
imagination to play out possible dystopian implications of the restorative
justice proposal. Scholars have already pointed out that the mythic,
romanticized language of the field tends to privilege some voices while
silencing others.161 What of the disputant who does not share the same
159 Id. at 266. This is the conclusion of Braithwaite's book, which accounts in part
for some of the aspirational tone.
160 Id. at 255.
161 See, e.g., Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice: The Real Story, 4 PUNISHMENT &
Soc'y 55, 62-63 (2002), available at http://pun.sagepub.com/content/4/1/55 (noting that
restorative justice scholars often "construct[] origin myths" of indigenous dispute
resolution practices as the basis for arguments that "superior justice form[s]" exist, and
that romanticizing these practices leads to, among other things, convenient omissions and
problematic gendering of restorative justice concepts (e.g., justice as male and care as
female)); see also Anne Cossins, Restorative Justice and Child Sex Offences: The Theory
and the Practice, 48 BRrr. J. CRIMINOL. 359, 371-72 (2008) (arguing that restorative
justice programs have not been able to sufficiently even out the power disparities
between victims and offenders and so should not be used in cases involving the sexual
assault of a child). In a response to Cossins's article, Daly noted that Cossins's analysis
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understanding of the values that "bubble up" from the "indigenous
deliberation of disputes" by the "people"?1 62 Who is to say that widespread
or even universally-held custom necessarily has any moral value?163 And
why is the prevention of disputes by corporate interests something that
necessarily tracks the ends of restorative justice? Following Kafka, one could
imagine the Ombuds, a silky-voiced character who manipulates the hapless,
underresourced Employee or Consumer through various cognitive heuristics
into willingly foregoing meritorious claims, thus protecting the organization
from shouldering costs associated with investigation, procedure, and possible
impacts on human resources. 164
Indeed, one of the most trenchant ADR critiques is that alternative
processes tend to divest disputes of any inherent rightness/wrongness and
instead recast them as neutral, interest-based processes that support
provided useful critique but "innovation" in particular contexts of sexual violence was
still required.
162 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 149, at 265.
163 The attempt to universalize subjective, contingent values as "universal" was a
common concern of Leff's work as well. See Memorandum, supra note 34, at 885 ("[If]
one discovered that it was part of the nature of humans frequently to enslave each other
and occasionally to drop flaming napalm on newborn babes. . .[it accordingly would be
quite difficult to accept] man as the measure of goodness").
164 The ombuds phenomenon is interesting in part because it is almost universally
lauded, see supra note 120, with scant critical review of the role. See, e.g., Mary Rowe,
An Organizational Ombuds Office in a System for Dealing with Conflict and Learning
from Conflict, or "Conflict Management System", 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 279 (2009)
(describing the complimentary role of an ombuds office within a conflict management
system); Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007
J. DIsP. RESOL. 1 (2007) (discussing how ombuds offices can effectuate systemic change
and shape public norms); D. Leah Meltzer, The Federal Workplace Ombuds, 13 OHIO ST.
J. ON DisP. RESOL. 549 (1998) (evaluating federal agency ombuds case studies and
providing recommendations for effective ombuds offices); Shirley A. Wiegand, A Just
and Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation with the Ombuds Model, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 95 (1996) (advocating for an ombuds model to support and possibly
supplant mediation). Further research on how ombuds actually interact with constituents
and sponsors would be helpful. Additionally, it would be interesting to see how many
dispute systems design models recommend the creation of an ombuds office, which may
perhaps suggest that actual system changes are insufficient without installing a skilled
person to operate the levers of organizational dispute processing. See, e.g., Carol S. Houk
& Lauren M. Edelstein, Beyond Apology to Early Non-Judicial Resolution: The
MedicOm Program as a Patient-Safety Focused Alternative to Malpractice Litigation, 29
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 411 (2008) (advocating within dispute systems design
context for the use of medical ombuds/mediator programs to resolve patient and provider
disputes and medical malpractice claims in a non-adversarial way).
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essentially capitalist values.165 Dumping toxic waste into a waterway
becomes, on this view, not "evil" but rather an "option" -that might be more
or less attractive, given other interests and other options. This nonjudgmental
stance is, in many ways, what makes ADR work; at the same time, it perhaps
has also become what makes ADR problematic for those who would seek
justice.166
To be clear, an ADR dystopia does not occur when designers try out a
new innovation and fail, for whatever reason. ADR dystopias occur when
alternative processes deliver strikingly opposite results to stated goals, as in
Braithwaite's description of early case management; or leave participants
dissatisfied but unable to determine or articulate whether the outcome is just,
as in Grillo's analysis of the gendered dimension of divorce mediation; or,
relatedly, provide participants with a heady dose of apparently procedural
justice (for example, being treated with courtesy and respect in the presence
of a self-described neutral) without giving them any "actual" justice, as in
Silbey's critique of the "neutral" valence of mediation; or vilify conflict
while overemphasizing, as a normative matter, the importance of getting
along. ADR dystopias convince participants to lay down their arms and then
abandon those participants, stripped of formal protections and hidden from
public view, to the vagaries and predations of coercive corporate and state
interests.
C. Implications for ADR Scholars and Practitioners
The utopian/dystopian dynamic-a dynamic that encompasses both how
ADR evokes hunger games as an instrument of change and how ADR is
susceptible to becoming a hunger game-is a typical trajectory for ADR-
165 See generally Cohen, supra note 13; see also Amy Guttman, How Not To
Resolve Moral Conflicts in Politics, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 6-7 (1999)
(noting, among other things, that interest-based dispute resolution processes do not
necessarily lead to moral results).
166 See, e.g., Kevin Avruch, Toward an Expanded "Canon" of Negotiation Theory:
Identity, Ideological, and Values-Based Conflict and the Need for a New Heuristic, 89
MARQ. L. REV. 567, 578-82 (2006). Stanford Law School has recently launched an
international human rights clinic that attempts to link human rights work and conflict
resolution practices. See International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic,
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/clinics/ihrcr/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2012). The
clinic's faculty leads, Jim Cavallaro and Stephan Sonnenberg, noted that the two fields
have significant philosophical disconnects when it comes to assessing "good v. evil"
kinds of questions. James Cavallaro & Stephan Sonnenberg, Presentation at the
Washington University Roundtable on New Directions in Negotiation (Dec. 2, 2011).
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based scholarship and policy games: a strongly articulated dichotomy
between existing and proposed processes that invokes neoliberal fears (e.g.,
lack of choice and consent) and appeals to neoliberal values (e.g., autonomy
and self-determination).1 67 Certainly such rhetorical dualism exists in other
areas of sociolegal culture and scholarship-for example, one of the
politician's main weapons is to spin out the parade of horribles that may
follow a proposed course of action or nonaction; and scholars make their
livings from dismantling and rebuilding mousetraps-but in ADR, this
dualism is particularly acute.
There are at least two reasons for this. One, ADR promotes a culture of
problem-solving and creativity, which in turn encourages ADR scholars and
practitioners to develop "outside the box" solutions that need not track with
previous approaches. Unlike legal reforms, which are often much less
sweeping and ambitious, ADR proposals have an appealing intellectual and
practical freedom that is bounded only by the experience of practitioners and,
perhaps, the dystopian critiques of other scholars. Because of this, the
tendency to propose more radical innovations and wholesale changes may be
more pronounced in ADR scholarship, which could mean that "making the
case" for these radical changes requires more utopian promises and more
dystopian critique.
Two, and as mentioned above, ADR theories and practices often
explicitly refer to and incorporate the aspirational values that undergird the
field, as well as focus on the personal and interpersonal aspects of conflict
and conflict resolution. As everyone associated with ADR knows, this
"touchy-feely" dimension of ADR attracts many people and repels many
others. Beyond this attraction/repulsion, the touchy-feely dimension may
make it more difficult to analyze the semiotic valence of a particular
innovation, to see the innovation as circumscribed and constituted by its
cultural predicates, to generate critical distance on the device without
rhetorical distortion from the utopian/dystopian dynamic. In other words,
whereas the law can recognize its own utopian/dystopian dynamic through
the "parade of horribles" device, ADR may not have the same self-critical
167 As Carrie Menkel-Meadow writes, "our field of conflict resolution has little in
the way of generalizable propositions that work (explain, describe, predict, and prescribe)
across all domains." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in
International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and
Varied Contexts, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 319, 320 (2003). In describing the
utopian/dystopian dynamic in ADR, this article does not mean to set forth an
essentializing or simplifying proposition, but instead to provide a theoretical basis for
thinking through a recurrent dichotomy in ADR scholarship and practice.
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distance on its own ideological and rhetorical excesses. At best, this myopia
may make it more difficult to evaluate process innovations; at worst, it may
result in a moralistic complacency that alienates non-ADR people, stymies
productive development and innovation, and rejects existing political and
legal structures too quickly.168
The conditions exist now for ADR dystopia. ADR values are well-
established, even dogmatic and sometimes orthodox, suggesting an
ideological consistency and priority of values belied by the constant flux and
growth of alternative processes.1 69 Moreover, the popularity of ADR among
organizations and government agencies can be troubling at times,
considering that private individuals do not seem to share the enthusiasm for
alternative practice. As many scholars have pointed out, the failure of private
individuals to embrace ADR in dispute resolution suggests a legitimacy
concern with the very constituents that ADR attempts to serve. 170
Accordingly, more work needs to be done around interrogating the processes
and outcomes within alternative practice.
All this said, ADR practitioners and participants sometimes report what
might sound like utopian experiences-those real-life transcendent,
transformative interactions of forgiveness and resolution. These experiences
are important to keep in mind and incorporate into this theoretical structure,
if only because they offer some direction, however contingent and
overdetermined, to approaching conflict. For people who spend their lives
studying and working with conflict situations, this is no small benefit.
One possible area for future research along these lines is the
"heterotopia"-the "other" space, and often defined alongside utopias and
dystopias-a Foucauldian theoretical construct 71 that has become popular in
168 This brings us back to Leff and the endless search for determinate answers.
Valorizing alternative processes as more enlightened, more moral, more utopian, more
spiritual/mindful, is perhaps nothing more than an effort to supply external guidance and
extrasystematic metrics where none exist.
169 For example, compulsory processes in ADR are increasingly common. "It is
perhaps the central irony of the recent success of ADR that it is built on the sort of
mandatory approach that ADR rejected throughout most of its history." Landsman, supra
note 10, at 1600.
170 See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 988
(2000) ("Institutional support [for ADR] is visibly high, but voluntary usage remains low
and is marked both by a pervasive sense of silent skepticism by ADR outsiders and by
mounting disappointment and disillusionment from ADR insiders.").
171 Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces, 16 DIACRrrcs 22, 24 (1986), available at
http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html.
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urban planning and in some pockets of legal scholarship.172 Heterotopias are
"effectively enacted utopias," highly constructed and demarcated spaces that
effectuate some aspect of utopian vision.173 For ADR theorists, the idea of
heterotopia may provide important new insights into how ADR ideologies,
actual practices, and physical settings contribute to dispute processing and
resolution, and even why utopian goals apparently can be realized at
times.174
Finally, it is important to remember that, pedestrian though it may sound
and as counter-dystopian as it might be, positive change may require utopian,
172 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210,
214 (2007) (using heterotopia to interrogate conceptions of space and place on the web);
Kevin Douglas Kuswa, Suburbfication, Segregation and the Consolidation of the
Highway Machine, 3 J.L. Soc'Y 31, 63-64 (2002) (examining suburbs and highways as
examples of heterotopias); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Three Metaphors for a New
Conception of Law: The Frontier, the Baroque, and the South, 29 LAw & Soc'Y REV.
569, 573 (1995) (positing heterotopia as theoretical vehicle for reimagining metaphors for
the law: the South, the baroque, and the frontier).
173 Foucault offered the mirror as an example of a heterotopia: an actual and not-
imaged space (because you are seeing yourself in it) that is nonetheless inaccessible; both
real and virtual all at once. Prisons, psychiatric hospitals, and military schools are all
heterotopias in that they preserve mainstream normalcy by sequestering and possibly
reforming deviants. The museum, the garden, and the cemetery are all heterotopias in that
they establish dominance and (beautiful) order over what is otherwise chaotic, namely the
passage of time and erosive, uncontrollable nature. Colonies and brothels are two other
instructive instances of heterotopias, spaces that offer meticulous order (in contrast to the
untidiness of everyday life) or illusions made real (in contrast to the drab reality of
everyday life).
174 In an upcoming project, I am going to examine the question "where does ADR
happen?" This is not an easy question to answer, in part because of the plurality of
processes available within different contexts and for different kinds of disputes or
dealmaking situations; in part because of the private and/or extralegal character of many
of these processes; in part because ADR encompasses not just "formal" processes like
arbitration but also more upstream dispute resolution and prevention efforts, as
envisioned by ombuds programs and organizational ADR training and community
intervention efforts. Justice centers, school cafeterias, human resource offices, conference
rooms, churches, coffee shops, the internet and the telephone, museums, streets and
sidewalks, and homes are all possible sites for alternative processes. This fluidity of
possible locations for alternative processes stands in stark contrast with the relative
inflexibility of space choices within a litigation process sited within a federal system as
traditionally marked by territorial boundaries as ours.174 How ADR operates within these
multiple places that are geographically and temporally diverse yet supposedly "neutral" is
an important inquiry that may illuminate our understanding of how we experience
context-bound "utopian" outcomes in alternative practice.
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aspirational language. As Daly points out in her critique of restorative justice
myths:
In the political arena, telling the mythical true story of restorative justice
may be an effective means of reforming parts of the justice system. It may
inspire legislatures to pass new laws and it may provide openings to
experiment with alternative justice forms. All of this can be a good thing.
Perhaps, in fact, the politics of selling justice ideas may require people to
tell mythical true stories.175
Indeed, Thomas also notes that the "tireless" efforts of the early utopians laid
the groundwork for far-reaching social reforms that many Western societies
enjoy today, including public libraries and universal education. 176 These
examples caution that although dystopian narratives can be an important
check on utopian overreaching or reckless change, they should not paralyze
decisionmakers and process innovators.
V. CONCLUSION
This article began with the observation of two rising trends: one, the
increasing popularity of dystopian rhetoric in law, politics, and culture; and
two, the proliferation of alternative dispute resolution processes.177 These
trends may not look related, but they are. Generally speaking, the same
dissatisfaction with present institutions undergirds both developments. The
same fears about the future prompts critiques of the current systems and
hyperbolic prophecies about what will happen if things remain the same.
Moreover, much modem dystopianism and the proliferation of ADR have a
largely instrumental orientation: because the present does not satisfy the ends
of justice and as a result the future is in jeopardy, and because we have the
power to change our destiny through different rules and institutions and
practices and processes, we should make the choice to do so.
The rise of dystopianism and of extralegal processes presents an
175 Daly, supra note 161, at 72.
176 Thomas, supra note 110, at 46.
177 Kenji Yoshino's article on the resurgence of productions of Shakespeare's Titus
Andronicus served as an inspiration and model for my own critical stance here. Yoshino
argues that "our fascination with the revenge tragedy" of Titus and similar works "arises
in part out of our anxiety about the rule of law" and about the deficiencies and
overreachings of the modern regulatory state. Kenji Yoshino, Revenge as Revenant: Titus
Andronicus and the Rule ofLaw, 21 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 203, 224-25 (2009).
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opportunity to reflect on policy choices regarding these processes, both as
products of dystopian thinking and as subjects of dystopian analysis. Perhaps
new alternative processes are actually substantive improvements on existing
systems; or perhaps they are the embodiment of society's larger anxieties
about the adequacy of law to meet increasingly complicated needs; or
perhaps they are the instrument of corporations attempting to evade oversight
and regulation through private ordering of dispute resolution; or perhaps they
occupy multiple or different positions altogether. This article has sought to
examine these trends together and more closely, with an eye toward better
understanding why and how we develop alternative processes in modern
dispute contexts. Such an examination does not provide normative guidance
or concrete answers, but merely provides greater conceptual breadth for
thinking through the limits of law and of the process innovations that we
might devise.
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